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ABSTRACT AND KEYWORDS
Emotion enhances the encoding and consolidation of memory traces, leading to the 
salient reliving of emotional experiences. In the recognition memory literature, the 
induction of somatic arousal and feelings of perceptual fluency during retrieval have been 
associated with illusory familiarity. Understudied in this literature is an investigation into 
how one’s emotional state, independent of stimulus content, influences recollective and 
familiarity-based recognition memory retrieval. Two priming paradigms were employed 
in the current thesis research to contrast the effects of affective priming and identity 
priming on familiarity and recollection using the Remember/Know procedure. Enhanced 
familiarity-based discrimination was revealed using affective priming, selective to 
participants with low overall recognition performance. Identity-priming resulted in a 
response bias, indicative of an induction of erroneous feelings of familiarity. Both 
manipulations failed to influence recollection. These results illustrate that a heightened 
affective state can provide selective benefits to familiarity, dissociating from a confused 
sense of familiarity induced through increased perceptual fluency.
Keywords: Emotion, Episodic Memory, Affect, Familiarity, Recollection, Amygdala,
Arousal, Perceptual Fluency
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Emotion is a core attribute of subjective reality, effectively painting the internal 
representation of our multi-dimensional sensory environment in a way that guides 
behavior and social interaction toward biologically relevant personal goals (Lazarus, 
1991). Emotion is known to shape the remembering of past personally experienced 
episodes and events. When personal events are experienced through an emotional lens, 
memory for these events can be significantly enhanced, oftentimes leading to a reliving of 
comparable salience. Determining how the vast spectrum of emotionality contributes to 
the absorption of moment-to-moment conscious experience for later memory assessment 
is undoubtedly vital for a comprehensive account of human memory systems. The goal of 
this thesis research is to advance our current understanding of the influence that a 
heightened emotional state has on recognition memory retrieval, and further, to 
investigate the qualitative nature of those memory experiences.
To date, research has dealt primarily with investigating the interactive nature of 
emotion and episodic memory. Episodic memory is defined as the ability to consciously 
remember past events, tied to a specific time and place (Tulving, 1972). The majority of 
studies on memory and emotion have concentrated on the tendency of emotionally 
arousing experiences to produce vivid subsequent recollections for those events. In other 
words, this research has consistently shown that the increased emotional salience of an 
event facilitates the encoding and consolidation of the multi-sensory elements that 
constitute an episodic occurrence, and allows for these contextual elements to be 
reinstated more efficiently during retrieval at a later time (Kensinger, 2009). William
James has described that, “An experience may be so exciting emotionally as almost to 
leave a scar on the cerebral tissue,” when attempting to characterize the “bumt-in” effect 
that emotion seems to have on memory (James, 1890). The highly adaptive benefit of 
emotional memory enhancement is clear; being able to more efficiently reflect on 
emotionally and biologically significant past environmental interactions will allow an 
individual to avoid behaviour that in the past may have been dangerous, or gravitate 
toward repeating successful and opportunistic behaviours. For example, possessing a 
perceptually veridical representation of the layout of a dangerous area of town that you 
had been mugged in at some time would aid in the future avoidance of finding yourself in 
another possibly deadly situation.
1.1 Emotional Enhancement of Autobiographical and Laboratory Memories
There exists a general consensus in the empirical cognitive and cognitive 
neuroscience literature that emotional events are more likely to be later remembered as 
compared to events that are neutral in nature (LaBar & Phelps, 1997). Emotional 
experiences also tend to be remembered with higher levels of detail, particularly in the 
case of autobiographical memories that are of a negative valence. An interesting 
manifestation of emotion’s action on event retention is the prevalence of “flashbulb” 
memories for events associated with strong fear or sadness (Brown & Kulik, 1977).
Many individuals possess a detailed moment-to-moment recollection of highly arousing, 
consequential, and negative events, for example the day of September 11th, 2001. Other 
autobiographically relevant emotional memories, such as a birth of your first child, or the 
death of a loved one, are also recalled with extensive repetition and are characterized by
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an intense emotional reliving (Conway, 2000). Through the individual contributions of 
emotional valence and arousal, autobiographical and laboratory-created memories are 
made more durable, increasing the likelihood that an enduring memory trace is created.
1.1.1 Independent Contributions of Arousal and Valence
When defining the term “emotion” and its influence on memory processes, it is 
important to clarify that “emotion” consists of both an arousal and a valence component. 
Emotional “arousal” relates to the intensity of an emotional stimulus or event and has also 
been tied to the level of physiological excitement elicited by an emotion, while valence 
corresponds to whether an emotion is positive or negative in nature (Kensinger, 2004). 
Negative emotions such as fear, disgust, or sadness and positive emotions such as 
happiness, love, or pleasure, have been related to contrasting goal-directed motivational 
states with differing behavioural outcomes (Levine, 2004), with the later resulting in 
approach and the former resulting in withdrawal behaviours. Essentially, emotional 
valence results in changes to behaviour directly beneficial to survival, proving to be a 
valuable evolutionary tool that shapes the construal of our environment. Similarly, these 
two independent dimensions of emotion, valence and arousal, also offer highly beneficial, 
but contrasting, advantages to memory.
1.1.2 The Amygdala and Arousal
A subcortical structure in close proximity to the medial temporal lobe, the 
amygdala, has specifically been associated with the arousal component of emotional 
memories produced both in real-life and the laboratory (Glascher & Adolphs, 2003). 
Arousal has been tied to the release of glucose and adrenal stress hormones (e.g.,
Cortisol) during emotionally arousing events, and results in the enhancement of memory 
encoding, made evident by the successful later recall of information. In non-human 
animals it has been demonstrated that arousal-mediated enhancement of memory is tied to 
the activation of (3-adrenergic stress hormones within the amygdala (McGaugh, 1990). In 
humans, it has been found that the administration of a (3-adrenergic antagonist 
(propranolol) prior to the presentation of emotionally arousing versus unemotional stories 
leads to a decrement in the subsequent recall of details for emotional but not for 
unemotional stories (Cahill et al., 1995). These studies illustrate the amygdala’s critical 
role in memory enhancement related to emotional arousal.
It has also been observed that emotional arousal results in “focal” memory boosts 
for “intrinsic” aspects of an event (i.e., enhanced narrowing of encoding for the 
emotionally-relevant details) regardless of content valence (Kensinger, 2008). A specific 
example of this “narrowed” enhancement of encoding for the central aspects of an 
emotional event is the “weapons focus” effect (Loftus et al, 1987). It is a well 
documented observation that victims of robberies, domestic disturbances, and hijackings 
can vividly remember the weapon pointed at them, but often have difficulties in 
remembering details present in the periphery (e.g., facial identification of the perpetrator, 
details concerning other conspirators). During an emotionally intense experience it is 
adaptive to direct your attention to survival-relevant details (e.g., a weapon pointed 
directly at you) at the expense of momentarily insignificant aspects of that experience. 
While valence and arousal are both inevitably contributing to the emotional influence on 
memory encoding, valence has its own unique impact.
4
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1.1.3 The Role of Valence
When considering valence independently, it has been shown consistently that 
emotional stimuli with both negative and positive valence are correctly remembered with 
a higher likelihood than neutral stimuli in typical study/test memory studies (Hamann, 
2001). These types of memory studies involve an initial “study” phase where positive, 
negative, or neutral stimuli (oftentimes words or scenes) are exposed to a participant, 
followed by a later "test” phase where participants are to recall “old” words.
Interestingly, there seems to be a particular enhancement of “focal” emotionally relevant 
aspects of an event for negative stimuli (e.g., anger, fear, disgust) (Kensinger, 2009). 
Interestingly, in the case that both negative valence and high arousal characterize an event 
or laboratory stimulus, there exists an additive boost in memory for the most emotionally 
consequential and salient aspects of scene (Kensinger, 2000). This targeted emotional 
memory enhancement was illustrated in a study by Christianson & Loftus (1991), 
revealing that the retention of details found within a laboratory presented scene of a car 
accident will involve more accurate recall of characteristics of the car that was destroyed 
or the positioning of a victim at the expense of irrelevant peripheral details (e.g., whether 
there was a stop or yield road sign nearby). If an event is both negative and highly 
arousing, retention of details will improve in comparison to events that are only negative, 
or only arousing but not particularly negative.
1.1.4 Enhanced Memory Consolidation
The effects of emotion permeate the boundaries of initial memory encoding, 
facilitating the off-line consolidation of emotional memories as well. Consolidation
6
refers to the strengthening of memory traces that have been “dropped from 
consciousness,” and can be conceptualized as the “sinking in” of a memory. The memory 
benefits afforded to emotional information can be particularly pronounced after delays, 
and is taken as enhanced consolidation (Sharot et al., 2007). Some studies have shown 
that the enhanced memory for emotional images studied in the laboratory exists a full 
year after initial learning (Dolcos, 2005). A night of sleep has also been shown to 
specifically enhance memory for negative emotional scenes relative to non-emotional 
scenes (Payne, 2008). It is known that emotional arousal induced through pairing a foot 
shock and an unconditioned stimulus in fear condition experiments in animals results in 
increased amygdala firing rates for nearly 2 hours after learning (Pelletier, 2005), and that 
amygdala activity promotes long-term potentiation in the hippocampus (Nakao, 2004). 
Using fMRI in humans, Ritchey et al. (2008) found that functional connectivity between 
the amygdala and MTL structures at the time of encoding predicted successful memory to 
a greater extent after a 1-week delay as compared to a 20-minute delay for emotionally 
negative images. These findings highlight the tendency for emotionally significant 
personal occurrences to be made selectively resistant to later forgetting.
1.1.5 Neural Substrates of Emotional Memory
The underlying brain-basis for emotional memory enhancement has been tied to a 
core emotion processing network consisting of the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex and 
its interaction with medial temporal lobe (MTL) structures (Kensinger, 2009). The MTL 
is known to be vital for the formation and maintenance of episodic memories. When 
faced with emotionally significant stimuli, coordinated processing in the amygdala and
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orbitofrontal cortex has been shown to amplify sensory encoding processes taking place 
in category specific visual regions in the ventral visual stream (e.g., fusiform face area 
(FFA) and parahippocampal place area (PPA)) (Lim et al, 2009; Vuilleumier, 2007).
The amygdala is known to modulate the rapid relational binding of sensory details into an 
integrated event representation via the hippocampus, a structure found within the MTL.
Evidence for this neural account of enhanced encoding comes from functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies that have taken advantage of the “subsequent 
memory paradigm.” The “subsequent memory paradigm” is commonly used in fMRI 
studies to determine what brain areas are critical for the successful encoding of 
information into memory. Activity associated with the initial presentation of a stimulus 
during the study phase of a memory experiment can be sorted subsequently according to 
whether that stimulus was later remembered or “missed.” Using this technique, reliable 
amygdala and hippocampal coactivation has been reported to be present during the 
encoding of emotional stimuli that are subsequently successfully remembered as opposed 
to successfully remembered neutral stimuli (Kensinger & Corkin, 2004). During the 
retrieval of emotional memories, a similar amygdala-orbitofrontal-hippocampal activation 
pattern is evident, which is related to the vividness experienced during remembering 
(Daselaar, 2008).
The amygdala has been identified as a key structure that seems to amplify efficient 
associative binding encoding operations taking place in the hippocampus during 
emotional experiences. It is also evident that the amygdala enhances perceptual 
processing in category-specific ventral visual stream regions, highlighting that emotion
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specifically increases perceptual processing of stimuli held in attention. The contribution 
of emotional enhancement of memories through more efficient perceptual and attentional 
online processing must be considered when characterizing emotion’s influence on 
memory.
1.2 The Facilitatory Effect of Emotion on Attention and Perception
Emotion has been found to increase the attentional demands allocated to stimuli, 
usually in the context of challenging perceptual tasks (Phelps & Carrasco, 2006; 
Vuilleumier, 2001). The “attentional blink” is a phenomenon that occurs during rapid 
serial visual presentation paradigms (RSVP), where individuals make quick identification 
decisions for target stimuli among many distracter stimuli (Raymond et al, 1992).
Typical visual presentation latencies are around 100ms per image in sequence (Lim et al, 
2009). There is an initial target stimulus that must be identified (T1 stimulus), followed 
by a second target of interest (T2 stimulus) that usually goes unnoticed due to attentional 
resources being consumed by the identification of the Tl. When the second target is 
made emotional, the “attentional blink” is diminished, resulting in an increased ability to 
identify the second target as compared to neutral T2 stimuli (Anderson & Phelps, 2001). 
This study included words as stimuli, and compared the ability of participants to identify 
T2 words that were neutral (e.g., broom, distance) to words that were highly negative 
(e.g., rape, bastard). Interestingly, when a patient with left amygdala damage was tested 
on the identical procedure, the attentional benefit gained through making the T2 stimulus 
negative, disappeared. These findings suggest that there exists an attention selectivity 
bias for emotionally important environmental information, automatically rendering visual
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information available in the visual field when it otherwise would not be.
The amygdala has been shown to modulate more efficient attentional processing 
by both directly “tuning” neural responses to visual stimuli in ventral visual cortex, as 
well as indirectly through attentional modulation via frontal regions (Lim et al, 2009). 
After aversively conditioning building or scene stimuli through a pairing of mild electric 
shock and visual presentation of the stimuli, Lim and colleagues administered the RSVP 
task during fMRI. The T2 stimulus was either aversively condition or unconditioned and 
allowed the investigators to determine the activation patterns associated with enhanced 
attentional selection of aversively conditioned T2 stimuli. Using correlational mediation 
analyses, it was shown that the amygdala had a causal influence on increased evoked 
responses in the middle frontal gyrus and parahippocampal gyrus (PHG) related to 
successful T2 detection. It was interpreted that the amygdala contributed to increased 
attentional resources devoted to the T2 houses or scenes by enhancing middle frontal 
gyrus activity, and also amplified perceptual processing of those images directly in the 
PHG. Before these results were published, it was only known that the amygdala played a 
crucial role in the emotional enhancement of attention and perception; the use of elegant 
fMRI mediation analyses allowed Lim et al to show that aversive emotionality modulates 
attention and perception via the amygdala.
The beneficial effects that emotionality lends to attentional processing have been 
shown not only with the RSVP paradigm, but with other tasks requiring rapid visual 
search of emotional versus non-emotional stimuli. In accordance with the findings 
obtained with the RSVP paradigm, Ohman & Flykt (2001) found that during a visual
search task, snake and spider images were detected more rapidly than fear-irrelevant 
images (e.g., flowers and mushrooms) in a grid array of numerous distracter images. In­
line with the findings from RSVP studies, rapid search processes and attention are 
facilitated when emotionality exists among less emotional visual information.
It is known as well that perceptual processing efficiency is also enhanced for 
emotionally significant visual stimuli. Phelps & Carrasco (2006) cued sinusoidal gratings 
that varied in visual contrast and orientation with fearful and neutral faces quickly at 
75ms followed by an orientation judgment for the gratings. Judgment accuracy increased 
as a result of fearful priming, allowing for more accurate orientation judgments at lower 
levels of visual contrast as compared to neutral face priming. The authors argued that this 
enhancement of contrast sensitivity may have resulted from an amygdala-based 
modulation towards more efficient processing in early visual cortex. Given the findings 
of Lim et al (2009), which displayed a direct influence of amygdala activity on increased 
evoked responses in ventral visual cortex for aversively condition stimuli, it seems that 
this conclusion receives direct support from more recent functional neuroimaging 
investigations.
After having reviewed the line of evidence on the enhancing influence that 
emotional arousal affords to attention and perceptual processing, it can be seen from a 
mechanistic perspective how emotion can boost memory encoding processes. The 
efficient encoding of stimuli in our environment leave an enduring memory trace 
available to enriched consolidation, until a cue sparks the reliving of a past emotional 
experience. Another more select domain of episodic memory, recognition memory, also
10
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consistently shows influences of emotion that dissociate between the qualitative memory 
experience that it can subsequently boost (i.e., familiarity versus recollection).
1.3 Recognition Memory
When considering a more specific aspect of episodic memory, recognition 
memory, an advantage in accurate recognition exists for emotional versus non-emotional 
stimuli (Ochsner, 2000). Recognition memory is the ability to discriminate between 
previously encountered and novel stimuli, and can be based on processes of recollection 
or familiarity assessment. The idea that two independent processes underlie the ability to 
determine whether a stimulus has been encountered is referred to as the Dual-Process 
Model of recognition memory (Yonelinas, 2001). More specifically, recollection refers to 
the ability to consciously bring back to mind a previously encountered stimulus and the 
context associated with it at initial viewing. This context can include the spatial location, 
temporal location in relation to other events, metacognitive evaluations, internal states, or 
other external events associated with a prior stimulus presentation. Familiarity is the 
recognition of prior occurrence, in the absence of contextual reinstatement. For example, 
one may get the strong sense they have seen someone before, but have no idea when or 
where they encountered that person. Recognition memory studies typically involve 
viewing a series of stimuli (e.g., list of words, objects, or faces) followed by an “old/new” 
recognition test for those stimuli. The recognition test includes exactly half previously 
presented and half novel stimuli, forcing participants to endorse items as being old while 
also rejecting novel lures. Recollection and familiarity are known to be differentially
12
affected by manipulations of affect.
1.3.1 Recollection and Familiarity
To determine whether familiarity or recollective-based recognition is differentially 
affected by emotionally arousing pictures (e.g., gun held up to someone’s neck, a couple 
kissing); Ochsner (2000) conducted a recognition memory study using the 
Remember/Know procedure. The Remember/Know procedure is commonly employed to 
index familiarity and recollective-based recognition memory independently by having 
participants sort recognition judgments according to a meta-cognitive evaluation of the 
basis of their recognition experience (Tulving, 1985). The Remember/Know procedure 
involves participants first making an old/new recognition judgment for a test stimulus, 
and if a stimulus is identified as “old,” a Remember or Know response is given. A 
“Remember” response is given when the stimulus is recognized with accompanying 
contextual information and represents that recollection occurred. A “Know” response is 
given when the stimulus merely seems familiar in the absence of contextual recollection. 
Ochsner (2000) found that negative emotional images were subsequently “Remembered” 
(i.e., recollected) to a greater extent than positive images, which were typically “Known” 
(i.e., based on subjective sense of familiarity). The author argued that the tendency for 
recollection to be enhanced by emotionally arousing images (particularly negative) as 
compared to both positive and neutral images, illustrates how the increased 
distinctiveness, physiological response, and attention devoted to negatively arousing 
stimuli at first exposure, can increase subsequent contextual recollection. Positive stimuli 
in contrast were more likely to be “Known” than negative stimuli. Familiarity was
13
affected to a much lower extent as compared to recollection. These findings are 
consistent with past studies showing increased hippocampal activation during the 
encoding of later vividly recollected negative emotional stimuli (Kensinger & Corkin, 
2004). The hippocampus has been identified as a bottleneck structure vital for 
contextual retrieval in episodic memory, leaving conscious reliving of past experiences 
impossible without its integrity (Moscovitch et al, 2006).
1.3.2 Emotional Filtering of Past Experience: Unanswered Questions
The emotional enhancement of memory encoding, and the subsequent recollective 
nature of retrieved memory content have been emphasized to date in the literature on 
recognition memory and emotion. Left unanswered though by this research is a clear 
investigation into what role one’s emotional state and level of arousal has on memory 
access, specifically, emotionality being present only during later recognition and existing 
independently of the stimulus to be remembered (i.e., a neutral stimulus). We live in a 
world where many of the faces, objects, and verbal information that we come into contact 
with is relatively emotionless, while one’s personal level of arousal and “emotional 
mood” is in a state of continuous fluctuation. Manipulations employed by past 
researchers have typically varied the level of emotionality within the stimulus to be 
remembered, therefore cannot speak to the “pure” influence of an emotional state on 
retrieval operations without necessarily having to consider that stimulus encoding 
processes were also affected by its inherent emotionality. Any memory study that varies 
the emotional content of the stimuli studied and later remembered, necessarily present 
that content with emotionality at encoding. In this line of research, emotional arousal is
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conceptualized as something existing in response to the perception of an emotional 
stimulus, while the aforementioned stimulus-independent influence occurs in a top-down 
manner (i.e., emotional arousal “shadowing” environmental stimuli). To determine how 
emotional arousal may “paint” retrieval processes independently of stimulus property 
encoding, a manipulation of one’s emotional state during retrieval must be de-coupled 
from the content to-be-remembered.
It has been observed in the memory literature that one’s emotional state or 
“mood” can bias how one remembers past experiences. For example, in a study by 
Holmberg and Holmes (1994), individuals whose marriages have become more negative 
and less desirable interpret the nature of their marriage in the past as less happy than 
original reports. Also, students who were originally highly anxious about an exam, 
report that their level of anxiety was lower than it actually was if they performed well on 
the exam (Levine & Safer, 2002). This memory “filtering” of the emotional status of past 
experiences shows that one’s emotional “set” or “mood” can influence the nature of 
content that is retrieved in a top-down way, rather than just having an enhancing effect on 
memory abilities.
In the domain of recognition memory, only a few studies have manipulated 
emotionality independent of stimulus content. Sweeny and Paller (2009) subliminally 
induced positive emotion prior to the presentation of surprised faces, neutral in valence, 
at encoding in a recognition-memory study. Priming involved the 30ms presentation of a 
happy faces immediately before surprise faces (presented consciously for 650ms), which 
were the content to be remembered later (i.e., only surprise faces were consciously
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studied, and tested for later). Priming resulted in an increase in subsequent accurate 
recognition, even though the emotional manipulation went completely unnoticed during 
the experiment. Interestingly, it was also shown in this study that the rated “positivity” of 
the surprise faces primed by positive affect increased in relation to surprise faces that 
were primed by neutral faces. This study shows that an emotional state induced prior to 
the presentation of a memory-test stimulus can “filter” perception and enhance encoding 
processes. This de-coupled emotion enhancement effect suggests that one’s emotional 
state also has lasting memory effects.
Taken together, it can be seen that emotion effectively biases the content of 
retrieved memories in a way that is consistent with an individual’s current emotional 
state. Another domain of recognition memory research has shown that manipulated 
levels of perceived perceptual fluency and somatic arousal can influence familiarity 
assessment processes during recognition in a completely different way, by creating 
illusions of familiarity.
1.4 Perceptual Fluency, Arousal, and Illusions of Familiarity
Another line of evidence important in the development of the hypotheses formed 
in this thesis research, has associated illusions of familiarity during recognition memory 
retrieval to perceptual fluency and arousal. It is known that familiarity assessment in a 
study/test recognition memory experiment can be affected by increasing the fluency of 
perceptual processing of the stimulus being recognized (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; 
Kleider, 2004). While boosting the ease of perceptual processing of a stimulus is not a 
manipulation of emotional arousal, it has been shown that this fluency can produce an
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erroneous sense of familiarity for novel memory test items. In one such study, increased 
perceptual fluency of verbal test items was obtained through the use of subliminal identity 
priming (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989). When priming test words (at 34ms) with its own 
identity (e.g., a target word “house” primed by “house”), a bias to respond “old” more 
often during an old/new recognition test was seen for both hits and false alarms in 
comparison to test items primed with a different word (e.g., a target word “apple” primed 
by “wrist”). In a recognition memory study, a “hit” is defined as correctly responding 
“old” to a previously encountered stimulus presented during a learning phase, and a “false 
alarm” is an “old” response to a novel test item not previously encountered. The 
subjective sense of fluency created through identity priming led participants to interpret a 
“free-standing” sense of fluency as a memory signal for the same stimulus presented 
consciously. Interestingly, this effect has also been shown with non-verbal, non- 
meaningful perceptual stimuli as well (Brown & Marsh, 2009).
The perceptual fluency literature has shown that judging familiarity for a stimulus 
is heavily influenced by one’s expected sense of fluency for old and novel test items in a 
memory experiment, and has been described in the framework of the Discrepancy 
Attribution Hypothesis (DAH) to account for the illusion of familiarity created through 
identity-priming (Whittlesea & Williams, 2000) For example, one knows that new test 
items should likely have a lower level of fluency or familiarity while old test items will 
“feel” different. In the case of subliminal identity-priming, as used by Jacoby & 
Whitehouse (1989), novel test words experiencing a feeling of increased perceptual 
fluency have a discrepant level of fluency in comparison to novel test words not identity-
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primed. This attribution of discrepancy in the fluency of processing for a novel test 
stimulus leads one to judge it as familiar instead of new. Further, the subliminal nature of 
the processing fluency manipulation prevents individuals from attributing a source to this 
increased fluent processing, leading individuals to interpret it in the context of the current 
task. Using the Remember/Know procedure, Rajaram (1993) confirmed that the 
erroneous feelings of familiarity produced by identity priming manifest themselves as 
familiarity-based but not recollection-based memory decisions. It would be surprising to 
find that the fleeting feelings of fluency would be interpreted as false recollection 
experiences due to the fact that recollection involves the conscious retrieval of contextual 
elements of an initial exposure in relation to the stimulus at hand. There exists a debate 
in the recognition memory literature as to whether the sense of fluency erroneously 
interpreted as familiarity is related to an induction of autonomic arousal.
1.4.1 Arousal and Erroneous Familiarity
These studies show that a sense of fluency can be erroneously interpreted as a 
feeling of familiarity not tied to the reactivation of an actual memory trace. Left unclear 
by these studies is whether the subjective fluency produced through perceptual identity 
priming “feels” like an actual familiarity experience that may be elicited by a truly 
familiar stimulus. Some have suggested that the feeling elicited by increased perceptual 
fluency may be tied to a spark of arousal similar to those known to occur in response to a 
stimulus with a truly familiar status. It has been found that familiar stimuli produce 
increased skin conductance responses as compared to novel stimuli (Morris & Cleary, 
2008). Interestingly, Jacoby & Whitehouse (1989) were reluctant to call the subjective
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sense of fluency as being arousal-based. Important in this regard are studies that have 
utilized subliminal arousal-based manipulations during recognition memory retrieval to 
determine whether feelings of arousal administered during retrieval affect familiarity 
assessment in a similar manner as identity-priming.
In a clever study conducted by Goldinger and Hansen (2005), a covert somatic 
“buzz” was delivered through the seat of participants’ testing chairs during the 
recognition phase of a memory study. This somatic “buzz” was described by the authors 
as akin to an induction of arousal. Both overt (i.e., clearly audible buzz that obviously 
came from the bottom of the chair) and covert (i.e., buzz went unnoticed) conditions were 
included as a between-subjects manipulation during the presentation of test stimuli that 
included words and colored photographs of everyday objects. An easy and difficult 
version of the recognition test was designed where less distinct and imaginable words and 
pictures (clip art) were used in the difficult task, whereas in the easy task, coloured 
photographs and easily imaginable words were used. In-line with the Discrepancy 
Attribution Hypothesis, only covert buzzing resulted in an increased tendency to respond 
“old” to both old and new test items. This response bias also only occurred when a 
difficult version of the memory test was used. The authors argued that increased 
difficulty may have pushed participants to rely more on a subjective sense of familiarity 
when trying to discriminate between old and new test item, rather than specific contextual 
recollection, and only under these circumstances was the response bias present. 
Familiarity and recollection were not measured in this study however, leaving the 
question open as to whether this response bias was driven by familiarity-based
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recognition experiences. The authors argued that this effect was present only when the 
buzz was subliminal because participants were not able to attribute the source of the 
increased arousal to something other than the test items themselves. The attribution of 
discrepant arousal felt for novel test items is thought to exist only when the source of the 
arousal is unknown; otherwise the feeling can be discounted as something that is 
independent of the test item to be judged as familiar or not. The authors suggest that is 
“unexplained” arousal may have been the source of the observed response bias.
Although there remains some uncertainty whether the manipulation introduced by 
Goldinger et al (2005) had its effect specifically via a mechanism of perceived 
physiological arousal, the findings could suggest that boosted arousal during recognition 
memory evaluation is interpreted as similar to an actual familiarity signal under some 
circumstances. The congruency seen between the response bias present in Goldinger & 
Hansen (2005) and Jacoby & Whitehouse (1989) may lead one to believe that perceptual 
fluency manipulations embedded into recognition tests produce a similar arousal-based 
erroneous interpretation. An increase in perceptual fluency always accompanies a second 
exposure to a familiar stimulus when compared to an un-encountered stimulus due to the 
fact that unfamiliar stimuli are less perceptually familiar. Since we know already that 
familiar stimuli produce measurable increases in skin conductance responses, it is 
imaginable that perceptual fluency may be the root of a familiarity-based arousal response 
to begin with. In light of such findings, which link feelings of familiarity to increased 
physiological arousal, it may indeed be the case that an artificially induced sense of 
arousal, as manipulated by Goldinger and Hansen (2005), produces a feeling very similar
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to that of “true” familiarity. It is important to note that somatic arousal that is not tied to 
any particular dimension of valence may not represent a true emotional stimulus. The 
manipulation used in this study to induce arousal is unusual, and it is not clear whether it 
is in fact comparable to the arousal associated with valenced emotionality, for example, 
the feeling elicited in relation to a baby’s laughter or images of terrorism.
A real-world phenomenon in the domain of person recognition has been observed 
in the clinical neurological literature in a condition known as Capgras delusion. This 
condition highlights the interplay between affective arousal and feelings of familiarity, 
and has been reported in demented populations as well as in conjunction with focal brain 
damage (Alexander et al., 1979). Capgras delusion is characterized by the belief that a 
close family member, usually a spouse, is actually an imposter who has assumed the 
identity of that person (Hirstein & Ramachandran, 1997). This delusion has been rooted 
in deficient sense of emotional familiarity that usually accompanies the identification of a 
loved-one. Hirstein & Ramachandran (1997) demonstrated that a patient with Capgras 
delusion, DS, did not show the usual increases in skin conductance responses to familiar 
as compared to unfamiliar stimuli when shown photographs of family members and 
unknown people. The neurological profile of patients of this type remains unclear but 
these authors hypothesized that the underlying problem may be in part to a disconnection 
between face-processing visual areas and emotion related limbic system regions in the 
temporal lobe. Hirstein and Ramachandran suggested that the delusional nature of this 
condition may not only result from this limbic “disconnection,” but may also result from 
additional cerebral atrophy in frontal regions that would be important in the evaluation of
inappropriate feelings of affective familiarity in response to an individual (Alexander et 
al., 1979).
After having reviewed the emotion and recognition memory literature highlighting 
the recollective benefit afforded to emotional stimuli, and the perceptual fluency 
literature, which as associated illusions of familiarity to fluency and autonomic arousal, it 
becomes clear that many questions remain open concerning how stimulus-independent 
affect may influence familiarity assessment. Capgras delusion is an unfortunate but 
interesting manifestation of the interplay between affect, arousal, and familiarity, and 
suggests that these dimensions of conscious experience are highly interwoven. The 
experiments outlined ahead will attempt to clarify the relationship between these two 
contrasting domains of recognition memory research.
1.5 Goals of the Current Study
The aim of this thesis research is to investigate the relationship between emotional 
arousal and familiarity assessment with two different priming paradigms, and to examine 
the resulting findings in the context of the Dual-Process Model of recognition memory. 
Both experiments will make use of a subliminal priming paradigm during the test phase 
of a recognition memory task, with the primary difference between both experiments 
being the nature of the prime stimulus. In Experiment 1, the priming manipulation will 
involve subliminal presentation of faces with fearful emotional expressions but with a 
different identity then the test items that are being primed in the context of the recognition 
decisions. In line with terminology used in the broader literature on emotion, I will refer
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to this as an affective-priming manipulation. Experiment 2 will incorporate a modified 
Jacoby & Whitehouse (1989) paradigm, again using faces as stimuli. More specifically, 
to manipulate perceptual fluency, neutral faces used for the memory task will be primed 
by that same neutral identity. I will refer to this manipulation as identity priming. The 
aim of Experiment 2 is to determine to what extent an induction of a sense of perceptual 
fluency during memory retrieval will affect memory differently than the affective priming 
manipulation used in Experiment 1. Due to the considerable evidence linking perceptual 
fluency manipulations to arousal (Morris & Cleary, 2008; Goldinger & Hansen, 2005), it 
appears promising to contrast the effects of identity priming with an affective priming 
manipulation characterized by negative valence (i.e., fearful expression faces). Both 
experiments will take advantage of the Remember/Know procedure to measure the effects 
of priming on recollective and familiarity-based recognition processes.
Faces will be used as stimuli primarily due to the fact that face recognition is 
known to rely heavily on familiarity assessment (Aly et al., 2010), and a subliminal 
influence of affective priming on face processing was shown to be effective as an 
encoding manipulation in Sweeny & Paller (2009). Experiment 1 will test to what extent 
an induction of an affective state, occurring below participants’ level of awareness at test, 
will affect familiarity and recollection for neutral memory test stimuli. The goal is to 
keep presentation of primes subliminal, such that participants will only be consciously 
exposed to neutral, non-affective faces during the experiment. Fear was chosen as the 
expression of the prime faces due to the highly arousing nature of fearful faces, and its 
known association with robust amygdala responses in past research with fMRI by Whalen
22
23
et al. (1998). Towards this end, amygdala responses have been suggested to be elicited in 
response to the subliminal presentation of masked fearful faces, as is the nature of the 
priming manipulation used in Experiment 1.
The choice to use subliminal prime presentation was also motivated by the 
perceptual fluency literature that has revealed an increased influence of primes not 
perceived consciously on performance interpreted in the framework of the Discrepancy 
Attribution Hypothesis (Whittlesea & Williams, 2000). After memory testing, both 
experiments will also incorporate a forced-choice prime discriminability task to 
determine the effectiveness of the subliminal presentation mode, and to allow for later 
evaluation of the impact that prime awareness has on priming effects.
1.5.1 Experiment 1: Hypotheses
The previous review of the literature concerning the interplay of feelings of 
perceptual fluency and autonomic arousal, gives some perspective on the multi­
dimensional nature of familiarity assessment. It remains to be determined, however, 
exactly how the induction of an affective state (containing both an arousal and valence 
component) during the time of recognition-memory retrieval may affect familiarity 
assessment.
One hypothesis, which takes the attention and perceptual enhancement literature 
into account, is that affective priming will have a facilitatory effect on familiarity 
assessment. Inducing a negative affective state prior to the presentation of memory test 
items, may lead to an enhancement of processing of test items, both in terms of increased 
attentional resource allocation and perceptual-processing efficiency. The negative
24
valence state may lead to heightened attentional vigilance towards the consciously 
perceived test item, allowing for increased accuracy of memory discriminations. 
Necessarily, an increase in memory accuracy would include an increased likelihood of 
endorsing actually familiar stimuli as “old” (increased “hit” rate) while reducing the 
likelihood of falsely attributing familiarity to novel stimuli (reduction in “false alarms”). 
It can be predicted as well that familiarity specifically, rather than recollection, will be 
selectively enhanced. By definition, familiarity involves the recognition of a stimulus 
independent of its initial contextual associations. Recollection on the other hand is a 
process that incorporates a retrieval of contextual information in relation to a stimulus. It 
is predicted that affective priming will affect the processing of the test stimulus 
specifically, thus familiarity should be selectively enhanced.
An alternative hypothesis concerning how negative affect induced at test may 
affect recognition memory takes into account the evidence put forth by the Discrepancy 
Attribution and perceptual fluency literature (Whittlesea & Williams, 2000). A 
subliminal, affectively arousing prime may induce the typical response bias observed in 
past experiments that “artificially” shadowed a test stimulus with subjective qualities 
similar to feelings of “true” familiarity (e.g., Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Goldinger & 
Hansen, 2005; Sweeny & Paller 2009). If a somatic “buzz” can be interpreted as 
familiarity, affective arousal produced by a fearful face prime may also be interpreted by 
participants in a similar way. This would lead to an increase in hit rates and false alarm 
rates for affectively primed test stimuli, and would likely manifest itself in familiarity- 
based decisions if one were to use the Remember/Know procedure, considering the
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findings of Rajaram (1993).
Importantly, it is possible that overall recognition performance should be taken 
into account when interpreting affective priming effects, given that that the effectiveness 
of the subliminal “buzz” induced during memory testing in Goldinger & Hansen (2005) 
occurred only for the difficult version of their task. From this perspective, participants 
showing an overall lower ability to discriminate between old and new faces may show a 
more pronounced effect of affective priming.
1.5.2 Experiment 2: Hypotheses
Past experiments have shown that an increased sense of perceptual fluency 
induced during a recognition-memory test can result in an erroneous sense of familiarity 
(Whittlesea & Williams, 2000; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989), thus it can be predicted that 
Experiment 2 will also show this pattern. Also predicted, and shown previously in the 
perceptual fluency literature, is that identity-priming will result in a response bias to 
respond “old” for novel and old test faces that are identity-primed. It should be noted 
again, however, that such an effect has not been reported for faces so far and would 
reflect a novel generalization of the effect in terms of stimulus content. It can also be 
predicted based on these past experiments (e.g., Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989), that the 
effectiveness of identity priming may be critically tied to subliminal prime presentation.
In other words, it can be predicted that only individuals with scores in the forced-choice 
prime discriminability task that are not significantly above chance accuracy, will display a 
response bias based on identity-priming.
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2 Experiment 1: Affective Priming
2.1 Methods
2.1.1 Participants
Fifty two individuals participated in the study (36 females, 16 males; mean age = 
22.15, SD = 4.09). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave 
their written informed consent before participation. Participants were compensated for 
their participation or received course credit. The study protocol was approved by the 
Research Ethics Board at the University of Western Ontario. Three participants were 
excluded based on chance overall recognition performance. Data was not used for four 
additional participants based on prime duration errors.
2.1.2 Stimuli
The stimuli presented were high-resolution coloured images of faces taken from 
the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database (KDEF) as well as the NimStim 
Emotional Face Stimuli database (Lundqvist et al. 1998; Tottenham et al., 2009). Faces 
with neutral expression and fearful counterparts from the same individuals were used 
from the databases. All faces were cropped down to a specific oval template, including 
the forehead, eyes, nose, mouth, and full jaw, while leaving out hair, jewelry, and ears. 
This was done to create a more homogenous sample of faces and to reduce large 
variations in hair style and other stylistic qualities across databases. Faces were 
surrounded by a rectangular background of Gaussian noise. Images from both face 
databases were intermixed for this study. Overall, 96 faces with neutral expression and 
with fearful expression were used, allowing for 24 unique neutral faces to be used in each
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of four lists that were assigned to four within-subjects test conditions. Two different lists 
were used as targets (at study and test) and two lists served as lures (at test). Both old and 
new test items were primed by either a fearful or a neutral face, creating a 2 x 2 
experimental design (i.e., test status (old or new) x prime condition (fearful or neutral), 
with one list being employed in each condition. Assignment of lists to conditions was 
counterbalanced across participants. To create consistency across the memory test 
conditions, each list had a constant proportion of faces from each database. Also, a 
constant proportion of males to females was established for each list of targets, being the 
same between conditions. Due to a limited number of overall face identities, target 
identities for a given condition were also used as the primes for that condition. Careful 
attention was paid to matching the number of times an identity, during the course of the 
test list, appeared as a prime before being presented as a target face to be sure that any 
differences in recognition could not be attributed to an identity being shown more often 
before being a target between conditions. Importantly, each target face was paired with a 
prime of a different identity from that list to avoid any influence of identity-priming.
2.1.3 Procedure
Face images were presented on a CRT computer monitor with the image 
presentation software E-Prime 1.0 (Psychology Software Tools). Participants were seated 
at a distance from the screen of approximately 1.5 ft. Face images occupied an area of 
about 4 in. x 6 in. on the screen.
An initial study phase took place, which included the presentation of 48 neutral 
face images that were used as target items for the subsequent recognition test (e.g., 24
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faces later tested with neutral face primes, and 24 paired later for fearful face priming). 
An illustration of event timing, image presentation, and trial types can be found in Figure 
1. Participants were informed that they would be required to make judgments about 
faces, followed by a memory test. At study, participants were asked to make likeability 
judgments. A fixation cross appeared for 1000ms prior to each face, which was presented 
for 650ms. Immediately after the face disappeared, participants were instmcted to judge 
how much they liked that face using a 6 point scale, with 1 corresponding to “strongly 
dislike,” and 6 corresponding to “strongly like.” This judgment of likeability was 
employed so as to get participants to attend to each face during study. After each rating 
was made, there was a 1000ms inter-stimulus-interval prior to the next fixation 
presentation. The faces designated to each prime condition were randomized.
After the completion of the study phase, participants rested for about 1 minute 
before receiving instructions for the recognition test. Overall, test instructions spanned 
approximately 5 minutes, creating roughly a 6 minute study-test delay period.
Participants were informed that they would then undergo a recognition memory test for 
the faces presented during the study phase. They were informed that half of the faces in 
the upcoming test were faces seen during the study phase, and the other half were new 
faces (i.e., not previously encountered), and also, that the order was randomized.
At test, a sandwich mask set up was used to backward and forward mask prime 
face images. This sandwich mask procedure is commonly used in verbal priming studies, 
and typically use random symbols strings (e.g., #&##&) to mask prime words (Forster, 
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Figure 1. Dlustration of events, timing, and priming trial types
used instead. Each face was preceded by a fixation cross for 1000ms, immediately 
followed by a scrambled face oval for 500ms, which was embedded in the Gaussian noise 
rectangle and served as the forward mask for priming. After the scrambled face, the 
prime face was presented for 33ms (i.e., 2 monitor refreshes at 60Hz), followed by a 
33ms backward mask, which consisted of the same scrambled face used as the forward 
mask. Finally, the target face was presented for 650ms (see Figure 1 for schematic 
representation of trail structure). Timing of stimulus presentation was confirmed to be 
within plus or minus 1 millisecond accuracy for the prime images, using the actual image 
onset times specified in the data output for each participant. Participants reported only 
seeing one continuous scrambled oval prior to each target face, which was made possible 
by backward masking with the same scrambled face after the prime. Participants were 
not told about any priming to take place at test. When the target face disappeared, 
participants were prompted with “Old” or “New” cues, and offered 3000ms to make their 
memory decision. If participants claimed that they recognized the face as “old,” a 
Remember/Know judgment was required in a self-paced manner. Participants indicated 
whether the experience of recognition was characterized merely by a sense of familiarity 
for the face or by recollection of the face. Participants were told that the “Know” 
response should be used when the target was only familiar to them, and when they lacked 
memory for contextual elements of the study experience. Participants were told that a 
“Remember” response should be used when the face was recognized with the retrieval of 
a contextual detail (e.g., remembered what they thought about the face when they first 
saw it during the study phase, recollect a noise present at initial exposure, remembered
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that they thought a face looked like someone they knew). It was emphasized that the 
contextual detail had to be specific to that face in order to be sufficient for a “Remember” 
response, due to the common initially observed tendency of participants to have an 
unduly liberal criterion for the specifics the prior presentation (e.g., “I think this is a 
Remember response because I remember noticing that there were only a few attractive 
males, I’m pretty sure I saw this man, and he is attractive). To ensure that participants 
completely understood the phenomenological distinction between familiarity and 
recollection, they were told to appropriately verbally justify the choice of memory 
experience for their first two “Remember” and “Know” responses. For example, if they 
believed a recognition experience was sufficient for the “Remember” response, they 
would describe the nature of the contextual element retrieved (e.g., “I remember, during 
the study phase, I was thinking that this face looks just like my friend Tanya.”). If this 
contextual distinction was not properly employed, a correction and reiteration of the 
Remember/Know distinction was offered by the experimenter, and that face was not 
included as one of the two correct descriptions of each response type.
After the completion of the recognition test, participants were probed in a brief 
interview to determine whether they were consciously aware of the masked presentation 
of face primes. They were asked whether they had noticed anything odd about the images 
presented during the test, maybe that the experimenter had not informed them about.
After their response they were fully informed about the nature of the face priming during 
the test.
Participants were then tested on a prime discriminability task in order to directly
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measure the conscious awareness of the prime faces. It was necessary to reveal the nature 
of masked priming in order to give instructions for the prime discriminability task. Every 
masked prime and target pairs were presented for this task in order to keep all timing and 
image presentation parameters identical to the memory task. This was necessary because 
the discriminability task would later be used as a measure of prime awareness during the 
memory test. Participants were to judge whether the prime presented for 33ms had a 
neutral or fearful emotional expression. Participants were told that half the faces were 
primed by a fearful face, and the other half by neutral faces. This forced-choice 
procedure has been used in other studies to determine prime awareness (Hannula & 
Cohen, 2005). The same 3000ms response deadline used for the recognition test was 
again incorporated in this task to keep the pace of the experiment similar to that of the 
recognition test. During the response period, participants were prompted with the text, 
“What was the expression on the prime’s face?” Participants were then asked to provide 
a “Fearful” or “Neutral” response.
2.2 Results
Figure 2 displays the proportion of faces recognized as “old” separate for both 
priming conditions (e.g., Affective versus No Prime (i.e., Neutral face)) and for 
recognition test status (e.g., Old or New). A 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted, with test status (old or new) and priming condition as factors, so as to 
determine whether affective as compared to no priming differentially affected the 












Figure 2. Overall proportion of target faces identified as “Old” as a 
proportion of the total number of faces in each of the two experimental 
conditions for old and new items.
significant main effect of test status, F(l, 51) = 267.121, p < .0001, but no significant 
main effect of priming condition, F(l, 51) = .236, p < .629, nor a test status by priming- 
condition interaction, F(1, 51) = 1.320, p < .256. It is important to note when reporting a 
significant main effect of test status for “Old” responses that this shows that participants 
are able to significantly discriminate between old and new test faces. To determine 
whether affective priming significantly affected overall memory discrimination (d’), a 
paired sample t-test was performed comparing overall discrimination associated with 
items affectively primed and those not primed, revealing no significant change, r(51) = 
.866, p < .391 (two-tailed) (Table 1).
In order to characterize to what extent affective priming affected the overall 
tendency to respond with a “Know” response (Figure 3), a 2 x 2 repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted, with test status and priming condition as factors, on the 
proportion of “Know” responses for each condition revealing a main effect of test status, 
F(l, 51) = 67.007, p < .0001, no main effect of priming condition, F(l, 51) = .128, p < 
.722, and no test status by priming condition interaction, F(l, 51) = 1.294, p < .261. 
Figure 3 displays the pattern of proportion “Know” responses for old and new test items, 
organized according to prime type. To formally measure the effect of affective priming 
on familiarity-based discrimination, d’ measures were calculated separately for both 
priming conditions using a commonly employed corrected familiarity 
measure that takes into account a participant’s tendency to respond with a “Remember” 
response (Yonelinas, 2003). Since “Know” responses were to be used only when 
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Figure 3. Overall proportion of target faces identified as “Know” as a 
proportion of the total number of faces in each of the two experimental 
conditions for old and new items.
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probability of a “Know” response given that an item was not recollected (i.e., 
F(familiarity)= know(know responses for a condition) / (1 -  R(remember responses for a 
condition)). A paired sample t-test was performed to compare the corrected d’ familiarity 
score for affective versus no priming, showing no significant difference r(51) = 1.283, p < 
.205 (two-tailed) (Table 1). To characterize the influence of affective priming on 
“Remember” responses (Figure 4), a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted, 
with test status and priming condition as factors, on the proportion of “Remember” for 
each condition, displaying a significant main effect of test status, F( 1, 51) = 125.286, p < 
.0001, no significant main effect of priming condition, F(l, 51) = .578, p < .451, nor a 
test status by priming condition interaction, F(l, 51)= 1.294, p < .867. To formally 
calculate recollective-based recognition when primed by a fearful or neutral face a paired 
sample t-test was performed on the proportion of “Remember” responses minus 
“Remember” false alarms for each prime type, displaying no significant difference, ¿(51)
= .191, p < .849 (Table 1).
In an effort to determine whether any potential impact of affective priming was 
associated with an individual’s overall recognition performance (i.e., overall hit rate -  
false alarm rate, irrespective of proportion of Remember versus Know responses), a 
median split of the sample based on corrected recognition performance was performed. 
This effectively split the sample into a low performance group (n =26), and a high 
performance group (n = 26). A 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted, with 
















Figure 4. Overall proportion of target faces identified as “Remember” as 
a proportion of the total number of faces in each of the two experimental 
conditions for old and new items
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the low and high performance groups individually (Figure 5), revealing a significant main 
effect of test status, F(l, 25) = 228.129, p < .0001, no significant priming condition main 
effect, F(l, 25) = .765, p < .390, but a significant test status by priming condition 
interaction, F(l, 25) = 6.818, p < .015 in the low group. Paired sample t-tests performed 
on the low group revealed a significant increase in the hit rate for affectively-primed faces 
as compared to the no prime condition, ¿(25) = 2.385, p < .025(two-tailed). In the high 
group, a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on proportion “old,” with 
status and priming condition as factors, showing a significant main effect of test status, 
F(l, 25) = 515.743, p < .0001, no significant main effect of priming condition, F(l, 25) = 
.059, p < .810, and no significant test status by priming condition interaction, F(l, 25) = 
.864, p < .361. Low overall recognition performance was characterized by a significant 
increase in recognition hits for affectively-primed test faces.
To determine the relationship between recognition performance, affective 
priming, and the tendency to respond “Know,” A 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted, with test status and priming condition as factors, on the proportion of “Know” 
responses for each condition in the low group (Figure 6). In the low group a main effect 
of test status, F(l, 25) = 13.566, p < .001, no main effect of priming condition, F(l, 25) = 
.162, p < .691, and a significant test status by priming condition interaction, F(l, 25) = 
4.877, p < .037, was found. To pursue this interaction further, paired sample t-tests were 
performed comparing affective priming for new test items against no priming, ¿(25) = - 
1.121, p < .273, as well as affective priming for old items against no priming, ¿(25) = - 










Figure 5. Overall proportion of target faces identified as “Old” as a 
proportion of the total number of faces in each of the two experimental 
conditions for old and new items as a function of priming condition 
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Figure 6. Overall proportion of target faces identified as “Know” as a 
proportion of the total number of faces in each of the two experimental 
conditions for old and new items as a function of priming condition 
(Fearful versus Neutral) and overall recognition performance group.
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priming and no priming for old and new items individually, the pattern of results leading 
to the significant priming condition by test status interaction was one of an increase in hit 
rates and a decrease in the false alarm rate for affectively primed stimuli. This pattern 
suggests that affective priming may have enhanced familiarity-based recognition. The 
test status x priming condition repeated measures ANOVA performed on the high 
performance group showed the typical main effect of test status, F(1, 25) = 105.616, p < 
.0001, but no main effect, F(l, 25) = 1.08, p < .309, or interaction, F(l, 25) = .544,/? < 
.468.
Familiarity-based discrimination (expressed as d’) was calculated for both the low 
and high performance groups and can be seen in Figure 7. It is important to note that a 
between-subjects factor, group, was only incorporated into an ANOVA when considering 
d’ familiarity and corrected recollection (i.e., “Remember” hits- “Remember” false 
alarms) because these measures are corrected for independence and incorporate both old 
and new recognition test responses. A 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA was performed, 
with priming condition and performance group as factors, on d’ familiarity revealing a 
significant interaction, F(l, 50)= 5.914, p < .019. Follow-up paired sample t-tests in the 
low group revealed that affective priming produced significantly higher d’ values as 
compared to no priming, ¿(25) = 2.494, p < .020 (two-tailed). As discussed above, 
affective priming boosted familiarity-based discrimination in the low performance group. 
Importantly, one-sample t-tests were performed on the d’ familiarity means for affective 
and no priming individually against 0 to determine if familiarity-based discrimination was 
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Figure 7. Familiarity expressed as d’ for each of the two experimental 
conditions as a function of priming condition (Fearful versus Neutral) and 
overall recognition performance group.
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significantly above chance, t(25)= 1.390, p < A l l  (two-tailed), while affective priming 
was associated with above chance familiarity-based discrimination, t(25)= 5.002, p < 
.0001 (two-tailed). In other words, familiarity-based responding was at chance in the no 
prime condition but was boosted to above chance performance with affective primes for 
the low performance group.
The proportion of “Remember” responses by priming condition was also 
considered after the median split to determine whether overall recognition performance 
was associated with different rates of recollection (Figure 8). In the low group, a 2 x 2 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted, with test status and priming condition as 
factors, on the proportion of “Remember” responses showing a main effect of test status, 
F(l, 25) = 81.635, p < .0001, no significant main effect of priming condition, F(l, 25) = 
.056, p < .815, nor an interaction between test status and condition for the low 
performance group, F(l, 25) = .750, p < .395. In the high performance group, also, a 
significant main effect of test status was discovered, F(l, 25) = 61.107, p < .0001, no 
main effect of priming condition, F(l, 25) = .567, p < .458, nor an interaction was found, 
F(l, 25) = .382, p < .542. While no apparent relationship between priming and the 
tendency to respond “Remember” was found, it is possible that the formal analysis of 
recollection (e.g., “Remember” hit rate -  false alarm rate) would reveal an influence of 
priming on recollection. As was performed on d’ familiarity, a 2 x 2 repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted, with priming condition and performance group as factors, on 
recollection scores for each priming condition. No significant main effect of priming 
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Figure 8. Overall proportion of target faces identified as “Remember” as a 
proportion of the total number of faces in each of the two experimental 
conditions for old and new items as a function of priming condition (Fearful 
versus Neutral) and overall recognition performance group.
by performance group interaction, F(l, 50) = 1.149, p < .289. Unlike for familiarity, 
affective priming did not differentially affect rates of recollection.
Importantly, it was necessary to determine to what extent affective priming 
contributed to any potential changes in response bias. As described before, a response 
bias can be described as how “liberal” or “conservative” participants respond when 
identifying a recognition test stimulus as “old” for a given experimental condition. For 
example, in the perceptual fluency literature, a more liberal response bias results from 
identity-priming during recognition testing (e.g., Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989).
Individuals are more likely to respond “old” to a test stimulus that is identity-primed, 
regardless of the actual test status. A measure of an individual’s criterion location, c, was 
calculated for familiarity-based recognition using corrected “Know” values for both the 
affective and no prime conditions (Martin et al, 2011). Criterion location, more 
specifically, represents the point at which participants decide to set their decision 
boundary between responding “New” and “Know.” A 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA 
was conducted, with priming condition and performance group as factors, on c, revealing 
no significant main effect, F(l,50) = .381, p < .540, as well as no priming by performance 
group interaction, F(l,50) = 2.254, p < .140. Affective priming did not significantly 
affect familiarity-based response biases (Table 1).
To assess the relationship between prime discriminability and affective familiarity 
enhancement, a regression analysis was conducted assessing the relationship between 
priming and d’ discriminability in the entire sample of participants (Figure 9). Priming 




Figure 9. Relationship between affective priming in recognition memory and 
discriminability on the forced-choice perceptual discrimination task. Data points 
pertain to individual participants. Regression line and 95% confidence interval 
are shown.
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condition from the d’ familiarity score for the affective priming condition (i.e., 
calculating to what extent affective priming increased familiarity-based discrimination as 
compare to no priming for each participant). A d’ value was calculated for each 
participant based on their overall level of hits (e.g., identifying a prime as fearful when it 
was fearful) and false alarms (e.g., identifying a prime as fearful when it was neutral) on 
the post-memory prime discriminability task. Figure 9 shows the overall distribution of 
participants on these two measures. The bivariate correlation between affective priming 
and d’ visibility was not significant, r (50) = -.092, p < .515. Further, another bivariate 
correlation was performed on only the low performance group, the group found to be 
significantly aided by affective priming. Again, no significant correlation was revealed, r 
(24) = .132, p < .519.
An alternative way to investigate the influence of prime visibility on familiarity- 
based responding was then attempted by performing a median split of the sample’s d’ 
discriminability scores, which split the sample into a low and high discriminability group. 
Within the low discriminability sample, a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted, with test status and priming condition, on the proportion of “Know” 
responses, revealing no main effect of priming condition, F(l,24) = 1.385, p < .251, nor 
a status by priming condition interaction, F(l,24) = 1.423, p < .245. In the high 
discriminability group, no main effect of priming condition, F(l,26) = .654, p < .426, nor 
a test status by priming condition interaction was found, F(l,26) = .314, p < .580. In 
order to specifically assess the influence of prime discriminability on d’ familiarity 
selectively, A 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA was then performed on d’ familiarity,
with prime condition and discriminability group as factors, revealing no main effect of 
condition, F(l, 50) = 1.674, p < .202, nor a significant prime condition by 
discriminability group interaction, F(l, 50) = .284,p<  .596. No relationship was found 
between prime discriminability and the tendency to respond “Know,” which would also 
determine whether affective priming was associated with a change in response bias when 
the sample is split according to prime awareness rather than overall recognition 
performance. No relationship was found between familiarity-based discrimination (d’) 
and prime awareness as well.
2.3 Discussion
The current experiment employed an affective priming paradigm to induce a 
fleeting emotional state below an individual’s level of awareness while they made 
attributions of past experience for faces with neutral expressions. Towards this end, we 
used the Remember/Know procedure to determine whether affective priming 
differentially affected familiarity-based recognition memory or recollective-based 
recognition memory.
The results of this study reveal that subliminal affective priming can act to 
enhance the ability to recognize whether someone’s face has been previously 
encountered, specifically, this heightened emotionality selectively enhances familiarity- 
based recognition of these faces. These results are in line with predictions derived from 
the literature on the effects of affective priming on perceptual decisions (Phelps & 
Carrasco, 2006) and attention (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Lim et al, 2009). It was also 
shown that only participants with an overall lower ability to discriminate between old and
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new faces showed the enhancing effect of affective priming on familiarity-based 
recognition memory. In other words, if participants could efficiently rely on sufficiently 
rich memory representations of the faces studied initially, affective priming did not 
particularly affect familiarity-based performance. Another possible explanation is that 
individuals in the low group may have been less vigilant in their attention toward test 
faces, allowing affective priming to initiate a vigilant attentional state. Participants who 
performed poorly on the test were significantly aided by an induction of emotional 
arousal, essentially boosting access to a familiarity signal that was not significantly 
different from chance in this group when no emotional induction occurred. Interestingly, 
the influence of affective priming was not determined by the level of awareness of fear 
present in the primes, as measured by a forced-choice discriminability task. Neither a 
regression approach, which has been extensively used to determine prime visibility on 
behavioural performance on a variety of tasks (Hannula & Cohen, 2006), nor a median- 
split approach revealed any significant influence of the level of prime discriminability on 
priming effects during recognition.
An alternative hypothesis that affective priming may result in participants 
erroneously attributing a feeling of heightened arousal to familiarity can be ruled out 
given that measures of response bias were unaffected by priming. Even though past 
recognition memory experiments have shown that administering a subliminal “buzz” 
during recognition can result in such a response bias, without any improvement in 
discrimination (Goldinger & Hansen, 2005), we observed a decreased tendency to false 
alarm to novel faces and an increased tendency to recognize previously encountered faces
as old. While Goldinger & Hansen (2005) compared their somatic “buzz” manipulation 
to arousal, it seems that emotional stimuli with confirmed negative valence can produce a 
different pattern of results.
As stated before, an enhancing effect of subliminal affective arousal on 
familiarity-based recognition is in line with the abundant existing literature showing that 
increased stimulus emotionality results in an increased allocation of attention and 
perceptual processing. It can be argued that affective priming led to superior attention of 
the target faces as compared faces primed with a neutral face. It is entirely possible that 
the features of the target faces were examined in a way that led to an increased capacity to 
compare those perceptual features with already established memory representations. 
Interestingly, the perirhinal cortex (PrC) has been implicated in sub serving both the 
accurate recognition of faces from memory as well as accuracy in a perceptual oddball 
task (O’Neil et al., 2009). Activation of the PrC during stimulus encoding has been 
associated with later familiarity-based recognition (Diana et al, 2007), and patients with 
surgical removal of the PrC for treatment of epilepsy can show selective familiarity 
deficits (Bowles et al., 2007). This past research showing a close-knit relationship 
between familiarity-based recognition and perceptual analysis strongly corroborates the 
claim that the emotional enhancement occurring in this study may have been mediated 
through a perceptual mechanism. Increased attentional devotion to the perceptual 
features of a face, in combination with more efficient visual processing, perhaps even 
over and above the attentional benefits, may explain the memory benefits discovered in 
this study. This combined perceptual/attentional mechanism of enhancement for
emotionally conditioned stimuli has already been shown in a recent fMRI study (Lim et 
al., 2009), which revealed that the amygdala modulates efficient processing in 
occipitotemporal cortex and the prefrontal cortex during the processing of stimuli that 
were previously aversively conditioned. Left unanswered by this memory study, is 
whether the amygdala may also directly modulates more efficient memory processing in 
the PrC.
It was observed also that the influence of affective priming was not associated 
with prime visibility in a forced-choice visibility task. It appears to be the case that 
subliminal prime presentation is not critical in order to see the enhancing effects of 
affective priming on familiarity-based discrimination. Interestingly, an emerging view of 
affective processing and amygdala function have recently discussed that amygdala 
responses are more robust to consciously presented affective stimuli rather than through a 
subliminal presentation, and that many studies, most notably Whalen et al. (1998), did not 
effectively measure the subliminal nature of masked priming (Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010).
When considering the relevance of these findings to the Dual-Process Model of 
recognition memory, it is important to note that affective priming selectively enhanced 
familiarity-based recognition. Recollection was not significantly affected by affective 
priming in this study. Importantly, familiarity-based recognition memory has been tied 
closely with item memory, and it has been shown recently that if details of a stimulus are 
encoded as an item (e.g., unifying the details “pink” and “elephant” into an item by 
imagining a pink elephant), these details can be retrieved via familiarity through the PrC 
(Staresina & Davachi, 2010). If the emotional manipulation employed in this study
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influences enhanced recognition through increased perceptual analysis of the target faces, 
one may be able to explain why the manipulation did not also lead to a reinstatement of 
contextual elements of the initial exposure to the face (e.g., if the participant 
liked/disliked the face upon initial viewing, if they heard a noise in the testing room, etc.). 
In such an account the memory benefits would be restricted to the information 
perceptually analyzed at retrieval, and in this situation the face itself is an item.
While the mechanistic interpretation of these results are highly supported by the 
past literature on the facilitatory affect that emotion has on attention and perception, it 
will be important in the future to determine the exact role that the amygdala plays in this 
enhancing effect. Of particular interest would be the coordination of the amygdala and 
PrC due to the fact that it has been strongly implicated in familiarity-based recognition. 
Also, the simultaneous coordination of the amygdala, PrC, and Fusiform Face Area 
(FFA) would be of interest due to the possibility that the amygdala may independently 
“tune” efficient processing in both the PrC and FFA when faces are the stimuli to be 
remembered. From an attentional perspective, it would be necessary to determine the 
synchronous profile of fronto-parietal regions during the post-prime examination of test 
faces. It is possible that if increased attentional devotion occurred for fearfully-primed 
faces, increased fronto-parietal coactivation could be discovered. While an fMRI 
investigation into the effects of affective priming on memory would be highly 
informative, it would be challenging to conduct, given the large sample of participants 
required to reveal the priming effect in the present behavioural study. In another 
experiment, we aimed to determine whether the use of a perceptual fluency manipulation
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via priming would affect familiarity-based recognition the same way as affective priming 
found in this experiment.
3 Experiment 2: Identity Priming
3.1 Methods
3.1.1 Participants
Forty participants participated in the study (25 females, 15 males; mean age= 
22.35, SD = 2.97). All participants had normal or corrected-to- normal vision and gave 
their written informed consent before participation. One participant was excluded from 
analyses based on chance overall recognition performance. Data from four additional 
participants were not included based on prime duration errors. Participants were all 
compensated, or received course credit for their participation. The study protocol was 
approved by the Research Ethics Board at the University of Western Ontario.
3.1.2 Stimuli
The stimuli presented were high-resolution coloured images of faces taken from 
the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database (KDEF), the NimStim Emotional Face 
Stimuli database, and the RadBoud Faces Database (Lundqvist et al. 1998; Tottenham et 
al., 2009, Langner et al., 2010). Only faces with neutral expression were used from these 
databases for this experiment. Stimulus preparation was done as in Experiment 1 (i.e., 
face cropping). Overall, 152 neutral faces were used, split into 8 unique sets with 19 
faces per set. To create consistency, each set of faces had a constant proportion of items 
from each database. Also, a constant proportion of males to females was established for
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each group of targets, being the same between condition sets. This gender matching was 
also introduced with respect to each of the specific databases from which faces were 
sampled.
Again, different sets of faces were used to be used as targets (old test items) and 
novel lures. For each set of old and new items, 3 priming conditions were introduced that 
corresponded to, (i) non-identity primes, (ii) identity primes, and (iii) primes of scrambled 
ovals without any identity (i.e., a scrambled oval in place where a face prime would 
usually be). Having three prime types for both old and new items resulted in a 2 (test 
status: old or new) x 3 (prime condition) all within-subjects design. Six sets of 19 faces 
were used as target faces because both old and new items had three prime types as stated 
above. One set of 19 faces had to be used as novel non-identity primes for old items, and 
the final set of 19 unique faces were used as the novel non-identity primes for the new 
test items. A complete 8-list counterbalance scheme was created with this grouping, 
having each set of 19 faces present in all 8 positions once.
For the subsequent forced-choice prime discriminability task, a pseudo random 
sample of 20 non-identity primed items (half target and lures), and 20 identity-primed 
items (half targets and lures) were selected. These items were randomized to create the 
task list. All 8 counterbalancing versions of the experiment had a unique, list-specific, 
arrangement of items for the discriminability task.
3.1.3 Procedure
Image presentation (i.e., monitor used, presentation software) was identical to 
Experiment 1. All procedures and image presentation parameters were the same as in
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Experiment 1, with one exception being that faces were presented for 1,500ms rather than 
650ms at study and test. This change was introduce in order to be in-line with the 
presentation parameters previously used in other recognition-memory experiments on 
perceptual fluency (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Rajaram, 1993). Primes were again 
presented at 33ms duration, verified by image onset time for every participant. Procedure 
and priming setup with timing as well as different trial types are shown in Figure 10.
After the recognition-memory test, participants were again probed for prime 
awareness and fully debriefed concerning the nature of the priming manipulation during 
the memory experiment. A prime discriminability task was administered, forcing 
participants to judge for pairs whether the prime presented was the same identity as the 
target face, or not. As the primary contrast of interest concerned identity versus non­
identity primes, we considered this the primary discriminability factor of interest. 
Participants were told that half the faces were primed by the same face as the target, and 
the other half by novel faces. All image presentation parameters were the same as in the 
recognition memory test. After the target face disappeared in any given trial, participants 
were prompted with the text, “Was the prime identity the same as the target identity?” 
and were required to provide a “yes” or “no” response.
3.2 Results
Figure 11 displays the proportion of faces recognized as “old” as a function of 
priming condition (e.g., Non-Identity, Identity, and No Face) and recognition-test status 
(e.g., Old or New). A 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted, with test status 
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Figure 11. Overall proportion of target faces identified as “Old” as a
proportion o f the total num ber o f faces in each of the three experimental
conditions for old and new items.
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whether priming differential affected the tendency to recognize a face as previously 
encountered. The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of test status, F(l, 39) = 
362.376, p < .0001; neither the main effect of priming condition, F(2,78) = .003, p < 
.997, nor the test-status by priming-condition interaction, F(2, 78) = .107, p < .899 were 
found to be significant. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the 
overall d’ measures for all three priming conditions, revealing no overall difference in 
discrimination, F(2, 78) = .399, p < .672 (Table 2).
In order to characterize to what extent priming affected the tendency to provide a 
“Know” response (Figure 12), A 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted, with 
test status and priming condition as factors on the proportion of “Know” responses for 
each condition, revealing a main effect of test status, F(l, 39) = 117.068, p < .0001, but 
no main effect of priming condition, F(2, 78) = .462, p < .632, nor a test-status by 
priming condition interaction, F(2, 78) = .308, p < .736. To formally measure the effect 
of prime type on familiarity-based responding, d’ measures were calculated separately for 
each prime type (Table 2). As in Experiment 1, this measure was calculated using the 
correction for independence suggested by Yonelinas (2002). A one-way repeated 
measures ANOVA was performed to compare the corrected d’ familiarity score for all 
prime types, showing no significant differences in familiarity-based responses by prime 
type, F(2,78) = .129, p < .879.
To characterize the influence of priming on “Remember” responses (Figure 13), a 
2 x 2  repeated measures ANOVA was conducted, with test status and priming condition 
as factors on the proportion of “Remember” response for each condition. It revealed a
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Table 2
Recognition accuracy, familiarity, recollection, and criterion location (c) for 
participants with high or low level of overall recognition performance














































Note: High and low performance groups were defined based on a split at d’ 0.15 














Figure 12. Overall proportion o f target faces identified as “Know” as a
proportion o f the total num ber o f faces in each o f the three experimental
















Figure 13. Overall proportion o f target faces identified as “Rem em ber” as
a proportion o f the total num ber o f faces in each o f the three experimental
conditions for old and new items.
significant main effect of test status, F(l, 39) = 126.012, p < .0001, no significant main 
effect of priming condition, F(2, 78) = .918, p < .404, nor a significant test-status by 
priming-condition interaction, F(2, 78) = .792, p < .456. To determine how recollective- 
based recognition was affected by prime type, a one-way ANOVA was performed on the 
proportion of “Remember” responses minus “Remember” false alarms for each prime 
type, revealing no significant difference, F(2, 78) = .745,/? < .478 (Table 2).
To determine whether effects of priming might be uncovered once participants’ 
conscious awareness of the prime type was taken into account, the sample of participants 
were split into a low and high discriminability group based on the d’ score on the identity­
priming discrimination task. A d’ value cut off of 0.15 was used to create the low and 
high visibility groups. This split of the sample resulted in groups of similar size (high 
visibility n=23; low visibility n=17). The group of participants having a d’ value under 
0.15 showed discrimination performance that was actually significantly below 0, r(16) = - 
2.533, p < .022, as determined with a one-sample t-test. It is important to note that the 
group mean for d’ discriminability was -0.14. Since a d’ value of below 0 represents no 
accurate prime discrimination, it isn’t meaningful to say that the low group performed 
significantly worse than chance. This value is taken to show that the group did not 
discriminate between affective and non-affective primes in the prime discriminability 
task. The high discriminability group did discriminate significantly above chance on the 
task, r(22) = 8.557, p < .0001.
A 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with test status and priming 
condition as factors, on the proportion identified “old,” revealing a significant main effect
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of test status, F(l, 16) = 119.964, p < .0001, no significant priming condition main effect, 
F(2, 32) = .554, p < .580, nor a significant test status by priming condition interaction,
F(2, 32) = .322, p < .727 in the low group. In the high group, the same repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted showing a significant main effect of test status, F(l, 
22) = 249.841, p  < .0001, no significant main effect of priming condition, F(2, 44) =
.341, p < .713, and no significant test status by priming condition interaction, F(2, 44) = 
.351, p <.702.
Given the prior hypothesis that identity-priming may result in an increased 
tendency to respond “old” for old and new test items (shown for overall recognition in 
Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989) in the low discriminability group, planned contrasts were 
performed for identity-primed new items compared to both non-identity and no face 
priming baseline conditions, revealing no significant increase in the proportion “old” 
responses given, F(l,16) = .408, p < .532. For old test faces, a similar planned contrast 
was performed revealing no significant increase in the overall proportion of test faces 
identified as “old” for identity-primed faces when compared to both baseline conditions, 
F(l,16) = .821, p < .378.
When investigating the influence of priming on “Know” responses, a 2 x 3 
repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with test status and priming condition as 
factors, on the proportion of “Know” responses for each condition first in the low 
discriminability group (Figure 14). A significant main effect of test status was revealed, 
F(l, 16) = 35.788,/? < .0001. The main effect of priming condition was not significant,














Figure 14. Overall proportion of target faces identified as “Know” as a 
proportion of the total number of faces in each of the three experimental 
conditions for old and new items in the low discriminability group.
interaction in the low discriminability group, F(2, 32) = .659, p < .524. In the high 
visibility group (Figure 15), A significant main effect of test status was found, F(l, 22) = 
93.627, p < .0001, with no significant main effect of priming, F(2, 44) = 1.405, p < .256. 
No significant status by priming-condition interaction was discovered, F(2, 44) = .008, p 
< .992.
It was previously hypothesized that under conditions of low prime 
discriminability, an increased tendency to respond “old” for old and new test items may 
occur for familiarity-based responding, thus targeted planned contrasts were performed on 
the proportion of “Know” responses separately on the low and high groups for identity­
priming as compared to non-identity and no face priming in combination. In the low 
group, a planned contrast comparing novel test items that were identity-primed against 
both non-identity and no face priming revealed a significant increase in the proportion of 
“Know” responses for identity-priming, F(l, 16) = 3.163, p < .047 (one-tailed). For old 
items in the low group, another planned contrast was performed, revealing a significant 
trend of an increase in the proportion of '‘Know” responses given for the identity-priming 
condition as compared to the non-identity and no face baseline conditions in combination, 
F(l,16) = 3.006, p < .051 (one-tailed). In order to confirm that this increase in 
familiarity-based responding for the low discriminability group was isolated to this group, 
planned contrasts were performed for identity-priming compared to both non-identity and 
no face baseline conditions for new test items in the high group, F(l,22) = .997,/? < .329, 
and old items, F(l,22) = .587, p < .452, revealing that the increase in the proportion of 















Figure 15. Overall proportion of target faces identified as “Know” as a
proportion of the total num ber of faces in each o f the three experimental
conditions for old and new items in the high discrim inability group.
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To assess whether prime discriminability was associated with differences 
familiarity-based discrimination (d’ familiarity) between the priming conditions, a 3 x 2 
repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with prime condition and discriminability 
group as factors, on d’ familiarity, revealing no significant main effect of priming 
condition, F(2, 76) = .082, p < .921, nor a priming condition by discriminability group 
interaction, F(2, 76) = .414, p < .662. Prime discriminability had no apparent influence 
on familiarity-based discrimination.
To determine whether the discriminability groups differed in their pattern of 
“Remember” responses, a 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with test 
status and priming condition as factors, on the proportion of “Remember” responses for 
each condition in the low and high discriminability groups, showing no significant main 
effects of priming condition or status by priming interactions. In order to selectively 
investigate the relationship between prime discriminability and recollection formally, a 3 
x 2 repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with priming condition and 
discriminability group as factors, on recollection (“Remember” hits -  “Remember” false 
alarms), revealing no significant main effect of priming condition, F(2,76) = .583, p < 
.561, as well as no significant priming condition by discriminability group interaction, 
F(2,76) = .340, p < .713.
Of particular interest in this study was the analysis of response bias for familiarity- 
based responses. An increase in hit and false alarms for test faces that are identity-primed 
as compared to both the non-identity and no face priming baseline conditions would be 
indicative of a shift in response bias, as it shows an increased tendency to call items “old”
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regardless of the item test status (i.e., old or new items). A measure of response bias, c, 
was calculated with corrected familiarity scores from each prime condition; the resulting 
data are displayed in Figure 16. A 3 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted, with 
priming condition and discriminability group as factors, on the response bias, c, revealing 
no significant main effect of condition, F(2,76) = 1.050, p < .355, nor a interaction 
between group and priming condition, F(2, 76) = 2.313, p < .106. To further investigate 
whether a shift in response bias occurred for identity-priming as compared to both non­
identity and no face priming in combination, a planned contrast was performed in the low 
group, revealing a significant decrease in c for identity-priming, F (1,16) = 6.223, p < 
.024. A significant decrease in c indicates that identity-priming was associated with a 
more liberal response criterion, which would indicate that participants in the low group 
were more liberally responding “old” for identity-primed test faces. To determine 
whether this decrease in c was isolated to the low discriminability group, a planned 
contrast was performed in the high discriminability group comparing identity-priming to 
both of the baseline priming conditions, revealing no significant shift in response bias, 
F(l,22) = .773, p < .389. Identity-priming was associated with a more liberal response 
criterion as compared to both baseline priming conditions in the low, but not the high 
discriminability group.
To be sure identity-priming did not affect familiarity-based discrimination the 
same way that affective priming did in Experiment 1, a one-way repeated measures 
ANOVA was performed on d’ familiarity for participants in the bottom half of overall
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Discriminability Group
Figure 16. Criterion location (c) for familiarity-based responding as 
a function of prime condition and discriminability group.
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recognition. This is the group in Experiment 1 that showed affective priming. Identity­
priming, non-identity priming, and no face priming did not significantly differ with 
respect to d’familiarity, F(2,18) = .423, p < .661.
3.3 Discussion
Past recognition memory experiments utilizing manipulations at retrieval that 
increase the ease of perceptual fluency of a test stimulus have shown that an erroneous, 
“fleeting” sense of familiarity can be produced for entirely unfamiliar stimuli. Many 
manipulations have been effective in increasing the ease of fluency of a perceptual 
stimulus, ranging from blurring a subset of stimuli to create, by comparison, easily 
viewable stimuli versus blurred during a recognition test (Kleider, 2004), to identity­
priming, which involves the unconscious presentation of a stimulus before the 
presentation of itself (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Rajaram, 1993). In the current study, 
identity-priming was used as a manipulation to determine whether the Jacoby Whitehouse 
Effect (i.e., a response bias involving increased proportion of familiarity-based Know 
responses for identity-primed stimuli) could be shown with faces and whether the effect 
would be different in its pattern from the effect of affective priming on familiarity-based 
discriminability in Experiment 1. The results obtained hint that the Jacoby Whitehouse 
effect can be revealed with faces specifically under low prime visibility conditions.
Overall recognition displayed no differences as a result of prime type (i.e.,
Identity, Non-Identity, and No Face). This was unsurprising given past findings that have 
shown the typical bias to respond “old” for novel and familiar test items, occurs under
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low prime visibility condition and manifests particularly for familiarity-based “Know” 
responses (Rajaram, 1993). When distinguishing groups based on participants’ ability to 
discriminate between identity and no-identity primes in a separate discrimination task, a 
trend was observed that was characterized by an increase in the proportion of familiarity 
based hits and false alarms for identity-primed items, indicative of the typical response 
bias seen in the past perceptual fluency experiments. The significant change in c, a 
measure of response bias, which was calculated using familiarity-based responding only, 
revealed the increased liberal nature of responding when Identity-priming occurs. In the 
low visibility group, Identity-primed items had a more liberal response bias (i.e., responds 
“old” with a “Know” response more readily) as compared to both non-identity priming 
and no face priming, showing how this change in response bias is significant and robust 
against varying baseline conditions. Also in line with Rajaram (1993) was the finding 
that Identity priming did not have any observable effect on recollection.
This is the first study to show the Jacoby Whitehouse Effect with faces. Until 
now, only verbal stimuli and non-sense perceptual symbols (Brown & Marsh, 2009) have 
shown this response bias pattern of results. Consistent with the one other study in which 
the Remember/Know procedure was employed with verbal identity priming (Rajaram, 
1993), priming selectively boosted an artificial sense of “oldness” that was interpreted by 
participants as a familiarity experience, rather than an experience of recollection. 
Experientially it seems reasonable that a subjective sense of fluency would be interpreted 
as familiarity rather than recollection, since recollection involves contextual recollection 
of details not present in the stimulus itself.
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4 General Discussion
Through the use of two different priming paradigms, it was shown that a 
perceptual fluency manipulation does not affect familiarity-based recognition memory the 
same way as priming with an affective stimulus. Importantly, affective priming 
significantly boosted familiarity-based discrimination rather than contextual recollection 
in Experiment 1; increasing perceptual fluency using identity-priming in Experiment 2 
led to an induction of a response bias in familiarity-based responding indicative of a 
creation of erroneous feelings of familiarity. The pattern of results obtained in both 
experiments were limited to familiarity, and these two different priming manipulations 
essentially affected the ability to discriminate between old and new faces accurately in 
highly divergent ways. The boundary conditions defining the circumstances, in which 
affective priming and identity-priming affected familiarity-based responding, were 
different as well. Only when participants were split according to levels of overall 
memory performance in Experiment 1 did affective priming display familiarity-enhancing 
effects. By contrast interindividual differences in identity-prime discrimination 
determined to what extent a response bias could be observed in Experiment 2. 
Specifically, affective enhancement occurred when participants performed relatively 
poorly in overall memory discrimination, while the effect of identity priming could be 
revealed only under low prime-discriminability conditions.
The findings from Experiment 1 are the first to show that a manipulation aimed at 
heightening a state of emotional arousal during recognition that exists independent of the 
emotionality of the stimulus judged in the memory decision, (i) can improve recognition
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abilities, and (ii) has an enhancing effect that is specific to familiarity-based recognition. 
Experiment 2 is the first study to show the classic Jacoby/Whitehouse Effect with facial 
stimuli, a highly socially relevant stimulus type. Contrasting affective priming and 
identity priming in two experiments satisfy to some extent the uncertainty as to whether 
illusions of familiarity produced by identity-priming and somatic arousal in past 
recognition memory studies (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Rajaram, 1993; Goldinger & 
Hansen, 2005) can be interpreted as acting through the same mechanism. The present data 
suggest that the mechanisms at work may indeed be different. Also, in regards to the 
findings of Goldinger & Hansen (2005), the present findings suggest that the somatic 
“arousal” induced through externally administered buzzers may not be the same as that 
induced through presentation of arousing stimuli with negative valence. It is important to 
note however, that arousal was not measured through the measurement of skin 
conductance responses in any of these experiments, including those in the current thesis 
research. The fearful faces used in the current experiment were collected from normative 
databases that were confirmed to produce significant levels of arousal though. SCR’s 
have only been associated with the presentation of familiar versus novel stimuli, and 
suggests that illusory feelings of familiarity may be associated with a sense of autonomic 
arousal (Morris & Cleary, 2008). It is possible that an induction of “arousal” via 
negative valence stimuli may produce a cascade of neural events, possibly originating in 
the amygdala, promoting attentional and perceptual benefits, while feelings of perceptual 
fluency that lack valence do not produce the same benefits, and are left subject to
erroneous interpretation.
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The affective enhancement of familiarity shown in Experiment 1 is most easily 
explained by relating it to the existing literature on attentional and perceptual processing 
benefits afforded to emotional stimuli (nhman & Flykt, 2001; Phelps & Carrasco, 2006; 
Anderson & Phelps; 2001). When trying to fully understand how an affective prime 
might enhance familiarity, it can be suggested that an induction of a transient vigilant 
state resulting from fear in the prime faces led participants to attend more efficiently to 
the target faces, rendering those targets to a more devoted perceptual analysis not 
occurring for faces that were not affectively primed. This mechanistic account is 
corroborated by the finding that only participants who performed relatively poorly on 
overall recognition display this effect. Low performing participants may have had a 
lower baseline-level of attentiveness as compared to those who performed well on this 
task and, as a result, were the only ones who benefited from the extra boost in attentional 
vigilance induced by the flash of a fearful face during recognition. Such enhanced 
vigilance during the recognition test is entirely in line with the findings reported by Lim 
et al (2009) and Anderson & Phelps (2001). These studies have shown that affective 
stimuli are more likely made available to consciousness in rapid serial presentation tasks, 
while under the same circumstances, neutral stimuli are usually unperceivable due to 
rapid presentation and distraction. Affective priming in Experiment 1 may have influence 
attentional processing in a similar way, by increasing the likelihood of effective target 
analysis. Lim et al (2009) revealed through mediation analyses performed on fMRI data 
that the amygdala causally influenced processing in visual cortex (PHG) as well as 
independently in the middle frontal gyrus, claiming that the amygdala boosts attention
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and perceptual processing independently. Interestingly, Phelps and Carrasco (2006) 
showed that contrast sensitivity enhancements were mediated through attentional 
vigilance. These two studies highlight that affective priming in Experiment 1 may have 
independently enhanced attention and perceptual processing of target faces during the 
recognition-test, while possibly leading to an interaction of the two as well.
However, other explanations relating to overall memory capacity differences 
cannot be mled out. It is possible, considering the known enhancement of perceptual 
processing efficiency granted to stimuli that are affectively primed (Phelps & Carrasco, 
2006), that affective familiarity enhancement could have also occurred as a result of more 
efficient perceptual processing in brain regions associated with both familiarity-based 
recognition memory and perceptual analysis, perhaps in perirhinal cortex (O’Neil et al. 
2009), without any mediating role of attentional mechanisms supported by other cortical 
regions.
An individual’s prime discriminability, as measured by a separate forced-choice 
discriminability task, did not show any observable relationship with the affective prime 
enhancement effect in Experiment 1. Even though participants reported having not 
noticed the face primes during recognition, a stringent assessment of prime 
discriminability measured by the prime discriminability task revealed that priming may 
not have been truly subliminal. Both the low and high recognition performance groups 
performed above chance on the prime discriminability task. Some participants reported, 
in both Experiment 1 and 2, that they noticed a “flicker” of light as the visible scrambled 
oval switched to the target memory face, suggesting that even though participants didn’t
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know that a face was being presented, some visual information from the prime (e.g., 
luminance) reached conscious awareness. This highlights the importance of the stringent 
post-test prime discriminability task, which directly measured participants’ ability to 
consciously appreciate the primes. Regardless, affective priming led to an enhancing 
influence on familiarity-based recognition.
The pattern of results observed in Experiment 1 is in direct contrast to the findings 
of Experiment 2, which revealed that identity-priming only produced an illusion of 
familiarity when participants performed at chance on a similar prime discriminability 
task. The importance of truly subliminal prime presentation is typically emphasized in 
the perceptual fluency literature, and can be related to the explanation of the Jacoby & 
Whitehouse effect in the framework of the Discrepancy Attribution Hypothesis (DAH). 
The DAH maintains the position that individuals interpret an increased sense of 
perceptual fluency induced by identity-priming as familiarity under subliminal prime 
conditions due to the fact that the actual source of fluency cannot be consciously 
attributed to the identity-prime. Considering that above chance prime discriminability 
was observed in both the low and high recognition performance groups, and no change in 
response bias occurred with affective priming, the DAH cannot account for the findings 
of affective familiarity enhancement in Experiment 1. The DAH was developed as a 
model to account for the erroneous feelings of familiarity resulting from identity priming 
and was also referenced in the interpretation offered by Goldinger & Hansen (2005), who 
induced peripheral somatic arousal during recognition testing. In past studies 
investigating how emotional arousal affects perceptual processing (e.g., Phelps &
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Carrasco, 2006); emotional arousal has typically been introduced at the level of conscious 
awareness, highlighting that affective influences on cognition do not require subliminal 
presentation. While the current thesis research did not manipulate to what extent 
consciously presented fearful faces might induce the same familiarity enhancement effect 
as subliminal primes, it would be a worthy endeavour in the future to test if the effect 
would still be present. The observation of no noticeable relationship between prime 
discriminability and the affective familiarity enhancement effect would suggest that this 
effect should be evident with consciously presented primes.
In Experiment 2, individuals who were unable to perform above chance on the 
identity-prime discrimination task showed a pattern of results consistent with the 
response bias seen in past studies that have manipulated perceptual fluency. Consistent 
with the DAH, participants who did not significantly perform above chance at detecting 
identity-priming were more likely to confuse novel test faces that were primed by their 
own identity, as familiar. Importantly, overall memory performance did not predict 
whether participants would show the response bias. Aside from the fact that affective 
priming showed a pattern of results different from that for identity-priming, the findings 
in Experiment 2 are noteworthy as they appear to be the first to show that identity­
priming can create an illusion of familiarity for faces as stimuli. Until now, only verbal 
(Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989) and abstract symbols (Brown & Marsh, 2009) have been 
associated with an erroneous sense of familiarity resulting from identity priming.
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4.1 Implications for the Dual-Process Model
The findings from both Experiments 1 and 2 are particularly relevant in regards to 
the Dual-Process Model of recognition memory that assumes that two independent 
processes serve the ability to determine whether a stimulus has been previously 
encountered (i.e., familiarity and recollection). The selective enhancement of familiarity 
through affective priming at retrieval that was observed in Experiment 1 provides support 
for the Dual-Process Model given that recollection was not found to be influenced by the 
manipulation. The pattern of results in Experiment 2 obtained with identity-priming, a 
manipulation of the perceptual fluency of recognition faces, also supports the Dual- 
Process Model through its selective effect on familiarity. If recollection and familiarity 
were not independently organized, an induction of affective arousal or fluency could be 
predicted to influence recognition regardless of whether the experience pertained to 
“Remember” or “Know” responses. The finding that familiarity rather than recollection 
is influenced by affective priming is especially exciting given that emotional influences 
on memory, in the past, have been almost entirely been selective to recollection. This 
past literature has narrowed its investigation of the interaction of emotion and recognition 
memory on circumstances where the stimuli to be remembered are emotional, and 
therefore have always incorporated enhanced encoding processing of stimuli before the 
memory test (Ochsner, 2000; Kensinger & Corkin, 2004). It is likely given the findings 
presented here that the recollective enhancement associated with emotional memories in 
the past can be attributed, to a large extent, to encoding processing rather than retrieval 
processing on its own. This possibility may be true considering that any study
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incorporating emotionality within the stimulus to-be-remembered, necessarily present 
those stimuli at encoding. The fact that another stimulus content (i.e., faces) shows the 
Jacoby/Whitehouse Effect pattern of results provides increasingly stronger support that 
manipulating perceptual fluency of stimuli during recognition memory retrieval affects 
familiarity-based recognition selectively.
4.2 Implications for an Adaptive Mechanism
Given that emotions have been characterized evolutionarily as discrete states that 
promote behaviour adaptive for survival (Levine, 2004), it is plausible that there would 
be a memory system in place in humans that enables one’s current emotional state to 
enhance recognition abilities under conditions of a reduced ability to attend (e.g., crisis 
situations characterized by intense fear). Being able to identify who is familiar or 
unfamiliar in a situation that requires rapid assessment of many visual stimuli acting as 
distracters would surely prove to be beneficial. If one were to try and imagine the 
experience of hand-to-hand combat, a situation imbued with fear, threats to survival, and 
distraction, it would be highly beneficial to be able to dissociate familiar faces that are 
likely less of a threat to survival from unfamiliar faces not in your squadron (e.g., the 
enemy). When considering that familiarity specifically may be enhanced in these types of 
situations rather than recollective abilities, it could be argued that being able to quickly 
and fluidly determine familiarity for stimuli in the environment may be more efficient for 
guiding behaviour than recollection in some circumstances. It might not be particularly 
helpful in situations that require rapid decision making to have full vivid contextual
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recollections of past experiences for familiar individuals, which might actually serve as a 
distraction. Situations characterized by intense emotional arousal may be more efficiently 
dealt with by making rapid assessments of familiarity in the absence of effects on 
recollection.
4.4 Future Directions
It will be important in the future to determine the neural basis of the affective 
priming enhancement effect in functional neuroimaging research. Accepting the 
interpretation that the underlying mechanism for this effect is attentional in nature, it may 
be predicted that the amygdala initiates more efficient frontal-cortex processing related to 
increased attentional resources for the target faces that are affectively primed. It may also 
be predicted, based on the considerable evidence linking perirhinal cortex (PrC) 
processing to both familiarity-based discrimination and perceptual appreciation of faces 
(Bowles et al, 2007; O’Neil et al, 2009), that the amygdala may modulate more efficient 
familiarity assessment computations directly within the PrC. Alternatively, the amygdala 
may modulate increased perceptual processing of faces in the fusiform face area, which 
then may feed visual information forward to the PrC located in anterior portions of the 
temporal lobe.
The large sample needed in Experiment 1 to uncover the affective enhancement 
effect makes it not particularly feasible for an fMRI investigation at the moment. An 
attempt to boost the effectiveness of affective priming could be attempted that takes 
advantage of a longer prime duration or an increase in the level of arousal induced by the
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prime. This may prevent having to search for less attending participants by performing an 
overall median split on recognition performance as was performed in Experiment 1. 
Another possible route to an fMRI investigation into this effect would be to incorporate a 
direct manipulation of attentional distraction during recognition testing given that it may 
be the case that low performing participants only showed the affective enhancement 
effect due to their lesser degree of attentiveness during the recognition task. To 
determine the brain-basis for this enhancing effect that a heightened state of affective 
arousal has on familiarity-based retrieval, modifications to the effectiveness of 
manipulation of affect will be needed.
Another future consideration is an incorporation of a measure of autonomic 
arousal elicited by affective primes. Collecting skin conductance responses while 
individuals perform the recognition test might be helpful when trying to show that 
affective primes did indeed exert their effect through a change in autonomic arousal.
This strategy might also allow for the separation of trials associated with a “successful” 
induction of autonomic arousal resulting from priming, which could be expected to show 
the effect of affective arousal on familiarity assessment most clearly. It is likely that 
affective priming did not significantly affect familiarity-based enhancement on every 
trial, but merely increased the likelihood of more accurate discrimination when averaged 
across a large number of trials. Regardless, the present study has shown that familiarity- 
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D u r in g  th e  c o u r s e  o f  th e  r e s e a r c h ,  n o  d e v i a t i o n s  f r o m , o r  c h a n g e s  t o .  t h e  p r o t o c o l  o r  c o n s e n t  f o r m  m a y  b e  i n i t i a t e d  w i th o u t  p r i o r  
w r i t t e n  a p p r o v a l  f r o m  th e  P R E B  e x c e p t  w h e n  n e c e s s a r y  t o  e l i m i n a t e  im m e d i a t e  h a z a r d s  to  t h e  s u b j e c t  o r  w h e n  t h e  c h a n g e ( s )  i n v o lv e  
o n ly  l o g i s t i c a l  o r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a s p e c t s  o f  th e  s t u d y  ( e .g .  c h a n g e  o f  r e s e a r c h  a s s i s t a n t ,  t e l e p h o n e  n u m b e r  e t c ) .  S u b je c t s  m u s t  r e c e i v e  a 
c o p y  o f  th e  i n f o r m a t i o n / c o n s e n t  d o c u m e n ta t io n .
I n v e s t i g a to r s  m u s t  p r o m p t l y  a l s o  r e p o r t  t o  t h e  P R E B :
a )  c h a n g e s  i n c r e a s in g  t h e  r i s k  t o  t h e  p a r t i c ip a n t !  s i  a n d  o r  a f f e c t i n g  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  t h e  c o n d u c t  o f  t h e  s tu d y ;
b )  a l l  a d v e r s e  a n d  u n e x p e c t e d  e x p e r i e n c e s  o r  e v e n t s  t h a t  a r e  b o th  s e r io u s  a n d  u n e x p e c t e d :
c )  n e w  in f o r m a t io n  t h a t  m a y  a d v e r s e l y  a f f e c t  t h e  s a f e ty ' o f  t h e  s u b j e c t s  o r  t h e  c o n d u c t  o f  th e  s tu d y .
I f  t h e s e  c h a n g e s 'a d v e r s e  e v e n t s  r e q u i r e  a  c h a n g e  t o  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n / c o n s e n t  d o c u m e n ta t io n ,  a n d  o r  r e c r u i t m e n t  a d v e r t i s e m e n t ,  th e  
n e w ly  r e v i s e d  i n f o r m â t io n / c o n s e n t  d o c u m e n ta t io n ,  a n d / o r  a d v e r t i s e m e n t ,  m u s t  b e  s u b m i t t e d  to  t h e  P R E B  f o r  a p p r o v a l .
M e m b e r s  o f  t h e  P R E B  w h o  a r e  n a m e d  a s  i n v e s t i g a t o r s  in  r e s e a r c h  s t u d i e s ,  o r  d e c l a r e  a  c o n f l i c t  o f  i n t e r e s t ,  d o  n o t  p a r t i c ip a t e  in 
d i s c u s s i o n  r e la t e d  t o ,  n o r  v o t e  o n .  s u c h  s t u d i e s  w h e n  th e y  a r e  p r e s e n t e d  t o  t h e  P R E B .
C l i v e  S e l i g m a n  P h .D .
C h a i r .  P s y c h o lo g y  E x p e d i t e d  R e s e a r c h  E th i c s  B o a r d  ( P R E B )
T h e  o t h e r  m e m b e r s  o f  th e  2 0 0 9 - 2 0 10  P R E B  a r e :  D a v id  D o z o i s .  B i l l  F i s h e r ,  R i l e y  H in s o n  a n d  S te v e  l .u p k e r
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SECTION 1: PROJECT REGISTRATION
[ 1.1 l Project Title- Memory for faces
1.2a Anticipated Project dates Start Date Nov 17,2009
Completion Date April 30,2010
1.3a Principal or Lead Investigator, or Sponsor of Student/Post-Doc/Visiting Scholar Investigator(s).
Name Dr. Stefan Kohler
Telephone Phone 661-2111 x 86364 J Email stcfank@uwo.ca
1.3b If this is a project of a student(s), Post-Doc(s), or Visiting Scholar(s), please provide names and 
contact information.
Name Devin Duke
Telephone i________________ i i i ____________________ i
1.4a Signature of Local Principal Investigator or Sponsor of Student/Post-Doc/Visiting Scholar 
attesting that:
ail co-investigators have reviewed the protocol contents and are in agreement with the protocol as submitted; 
all investigators have read the Tri-Council Policy Statement; Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Humans (1998) 
and the UWO Guidelines on Non-Medical Research Involving Human Subjects and agree to abide by the guidelines 
therein;
the investigator(s) will adhere to the Protocol and Consent Form as approved by the REB; and
the Principal Investigator will notify the REB of any changes or adverse events/experiences in a timely manner;
the study, if funded by an external sponsor, will not start until the contract/ agreement has been approved by the
appropriate university, hospital or research institute official.
the research poses no more than minimal risk
\iu i i  lCü~)
Signature Date
1,4b l Signature(s) of Student(s), Post-Doc, or Visiting Scholar attesting that they:__________________
a) have read the Tri-Council Policy Statement and the UWO Guidelines on Non-Medical Research Involving Human 
Subjects and agree to abide by the guidelines therein;
b) will adhere to the Protocol and Consent Form as approved by the REB; and
c) will notify their supervisor and the REB of any changes or adverse events/expenences in a timely manner;
Signature(s) Date
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SECTION 2: PROJECT 1NFORMATON__________________________________________
2.1 i Objectives and Hypotheses: Provide a clear statement of the purpose and objectives of the
l project. (1 page maximum)___________________________________________________________
T h is  s tu d y  in v o lv e s  tw o  e x p e r im e n ts  e x p lo r in g  e p is o d ic  m e m o ry . T h is  s tu d y  w ill e x p lo re  th e  
c o n tr ib u t io n  o f  a ffe c t,  s p e c if ic a l ly  th e  e m o tio n  e x p re s s io n  o f  fa c e s , to  fa m ilia r i ty  a s s e s s m e n t o f  
s tu d ie d  a n d  u n s tu d ie d  n e u tra l  fa c e s . A ls o  o f  in te re s t  is th e  ro le  o f  p ro c e s s in g  f lu e n c y  o n  fa m ilia r i ty  
a s s e s s m e n t  in  re c o g n itio n  m e m o ry . B o th  e x p e r im e n ts  w ill  in c o rp o ra te  T u lv in g ’s  (1 9 8 9 )  
re m e m b e r/k n o w  p a ra d ig m , w id e ly  u s e d  in s tu d ie s  in v o lv in g  e p is o d ic  m e m o ry . T h e  re m e m b e r/k n o w  
p ro c e d u re  w ill b e  u s e d  to  d e te c t  w h e th e r  fa c e  d is c r im in a t io n  o c c u r re d  a s  a  re s u lt o f  a  c o n tr ib u t io n  o f  
fa m il ia r i ty  o r  re c o lle c tio n .
T u lv in g 's  p a ra d ig m  allow  s p a r t ic ip a n ts  to  m a k e  tw o  ty p e s  o f  r e s p o n s e s .  T h e  firs t, a 
’■ R em em ber"  re s p o n se , in v o lv e s  h a v in g  a  s e n s e  o f  f a m il ia r i ty  a s  w e ll a s  a  s p e c if ic  d e ta ile d  m e m o ry  
re la tin g  to  a  s t im u lu s  a n d  its  p re v io u s  o c c u r re n c e .  T h e  se c o n d  ty p e  o f  re s p o n s e ,  a  “ K n o w ” re s p o n se , 
in v o lv e s  h a v in g  o n ly  a  s e n s e  o f  f a m ilia r i ty  w ith o u t b e in g  a b le  to  id e n tify  th e  s o u rc e  o f  th a t fa m ilia r i ty  
( i.e . h a v in g  a  s p e c if ic  a n d  d e ta ile d  m e m o ry  o f  a  p re v io u s  e v e n t) .  T h is  p ro c e d u re  w ill b e  u s e d  to  
d e te rm in e  w h e th e r  a f fe c tiv e  fa c e  p r im in g  s e le c t iv e ly  w ill c o n tr ib u te  to  an  in c re a s e  in “ K n o w "  
r e s p o n s e s  ( in d ic a tin g  a  re s p o n s e  b a s e d  o n  a  s e n s e  o f  f a m il ia r i ty )  in d e p e n d e n t  o f  p ro c e ss in g  flu e n c y  
m a n ip u la tio n s . A  b o o s t in  ’’K n o w ”  re s p o n s e s  w h e n  th e  p e rc e iv e d  e a s e  o f  f lu e n c y  o f  a  te s t  i te m  in  a 
re c o g n itio n  te s t  is  in c re a s e d  h a s  b e en  o b s e rv e d  in  p a s t re s e a rc h  R a ja ra m  (1 9 9 3 ) .
W e  a im  to  lo o k  a t e f fe c ts  o f  s u b lim in a l a f fe c t iv e  fa c e  p rim in g  (e x p e r im e n t I ) a s  w e ll as 
s u b lim in a lly  p re s e n te d  id e n tity  p r im e s  ( i .e ..  p rim in g  a te s t  f a c e  w ith  th e  id e n tic a l f a c e )  ( e x p e r im e n t 2) 
o n  b o th  fa ls e  a la rm  a n d  h it ra te s  in an  o ld /n e w  re c o g n itio n  p a ra d ig m , a s  w e ll  a s  th e  re s p e c tiv e  
c o n tr ib u t io n s  o f  fa m ilia r i ty  p ro c e s s e s  o r  r e c o lle c tiv e  p ro c e s s e s  o n  th is  r e c o g n itio n  d e c is io n . T h e  
e x p e r im e n ta l m a n ip u la tio n  o f  in te re s t  ( e .g . .  s u b lim in a l fa c e  p r im e s )  w ill c o n s is t  o f  a  3 0 m s 
p re s e n ta tio n  o f  e i th e r  an  a f fe c tiv e  fa c e  p re s e n te d  im m e d ia te ly  p r io r  to  th e  ta rg e t fa c e  (e x p e rim e n t I ) 
o r  a  c o m b in a tio n  o f  a f fe c tiv e  a n d  id e n tity  fa c e  p r im e s  p re s e n te d  s u b lim in a l ly  im m e d ia te ly  p r io r  to  
te s t fa c e s  (e x p e r im e n t 2 ). Im p e n d e n t  m e a s u re s  u s e d  w ill in c lu d e  re c o g n it io n  a c c u ra c y  m e a su re s  ( i.e .. 
th e  a b ili ty  to  c o r re c tly  d is c r im in a te  b e tw e e n  o ld  a n d  new  fa c e s )  a n d  a n s w e rs  to  a  fo llo w - u p  q u e s tio n  
a sk in g  p a r tic ip a n ts  i f  th e y  ’’r e m e m b e r”  th e  p re v io u s  n e u tra l fa c e  o r  s im p ly  “ k n o w ” th a t th e  n e u tra l  
fa c e  w a s  p re s e n te d .
In e x p e r im e n t  l .  w e  h y p o th e s iz e  th a t s u b lim in a l a f fe c t iv e  fa c e  p r im e s  w ill in c re a se  fa lse  
a la rm  ra te s  fo r  n o v e l n e u tra l  le s t fa c e s , r e s u ltin g  f ro m  a n  in c re a s e  in a  s e n s e  o f  f a m ilia r i ty  s te m m in g  
fro m  c o v e r t  a ro u s a l p ro d u c e d  b y  th e  fe a rfu l fa c e  p r im e s . P a s t re s e a rc h  h a s  s h o w n  th a t c o v e r tly  
p re s e n te d  a ro u s a l s ig n a ls  a t th e  t im e  o f  te st in  a  re c o g n it io n  m e m o ry  s tu d y  re s u lt in an  “ il lu s io n ” o f  
fa m ilia r i ty  G o ld in g e r  &  H a n se n  (2 0 0 5 ) . In e x p e r im e n t  2 . in  w h ic h  b o th  a f fe c t iv e  p rim in g  a s  w e ll as 
id e n tity  p r im in g  o c c u rs  d u rin g  th e  m e m o ry  te s t in g  s e s s io n ,  w e  h y p o th e s iz e  th a t th e re  w ill b e  an  
a d d itiv e  e f fe c t  o f  p re s e n tin g  b o th  a f fe c tiv e  a n d  id e n tity  p r im e s  o n  th e  r e s u ltin g  h it a n d  fa ls e  a la rm  
ra te s . T h is  b e h a v io u ra l e f fe c t w o u ld  re s u lt  f ro m  c o m b in in g  b o th  a  m a n ip u la tio n  th a t in c re a se s  
p ro c e s s in g  flu e n c y  fo r  n o v e l a n d  o ld  te s t  fa c e s , a s  w e ll  a s  a  m a n ip u la tio n  th a t p ro v id e s  an  
in d e p e n d e n t so u rc e  o f  e m o tio n a l a ro u s a l d u e  to  s u b lim in a lly  p re s e n te d  e m o tio n a l  fa c es .
PSYCHOLOGY EXPEDITED REB SUBMISSION FORM (VERSION - AUG 2004)
2.2
Research Participants:
If you are requesting to use the department's subject pool, please indicate the dumber of credits 
per participant __1____and the total number of credits for the study f  100___ _.
Briefly describe the sample, number of participants, and any exclusionary criteria, e.g.. exclude non- 
English speaking participants.
100 participants will be required with normal, or corrected to normal vision.
Describe the method of recruiting participants, and any compensation offered.
Participants will be signed up using the psychology undergraduate subject pool. Participants will be 
compensated 1 research credit for participating in the experiment.
Include one copy of the sign-up poster or advertisements if used.
Include one copy of the letter of information and one copy of the informed consent sheet.
Include one copy of your debriefing sheet.
If the research will not be conducted in the Social Science Centre, please indicate the location:
2.3
Methodology -  Describe the study design and procedure, i.e., what participants will be asked to do 
at each stage of the research, e.g. manipulations. (2 page maximum)_________________________
T h e r e  a r e  tw o  m e m o r y  e x p e r im e n t s  t h a t  e a c h  in v o lv e  a  s tu d y ,  d e l a y  a n d  t e s t  s e s s io n .  B o th  
e x p e r im e n t s  w i l l  h a v e  id e n t ic a l  te s t in g  p r o c e d u r e s  a n d  w il l  o n ly  d i f f e r  in  th e  s u b l im in a l  c o n te n t  o f  
t h e  p r im e s  d u r in g  th e  r e c o g n i t i o n  m e m o r y  t e s t  s e s s io n .
Affect Primes Study- A f te r  in f o r m e d  c o n s e n t  is  o b t a in e d ,  p a r t i c ip a n t s  w il l  r e a d  a  s e t  o f  
in s t r u c t io n s  o n  th e  c o m p u t e r  s c r e e n  e x p l a i n i n g  th a t  th e y  w  ill b e  j u d g i n g  h o w  l ik e a b le  ( o n  a  s c a le  
f r o m  1 -6 , 1 b e in g  to t a l l y  u n l ik e a b le  a n d  6  b e in g  th e  h ig h e s t  l e v e l  o f  l ik e a b i l i ty )  th e  n e u tr a l  f a c e s  
th a t  a p p e a r  o n  th e  c o m p u t e r  s c r e e n  a r e .  P a r t i c ip a n t s  w i th  b e  in s t r u c t e d  to  p r e s s  a  b u t to n  o n  th e  
k e y p a d  to  m a k e  th e  r e le v a n t  l i k e a b i l i ty  j u d g m e n t .  E a c h  n e u t r a l  f a c e  w i l l  b e  p r e s e n te d  f o r  2  
s e c o n d s ,  w i th  a  1 s e c o n d  in t e r - s t im u l u s  i n te r v a l .  A l l  p a r t i c i p a n t s  w il l  b e  g iv e n  10  p r a c t i c e  t r i a l s  in  
o r d e r  t o  b e c o m e  f a m i l i a r i z e d  w i th  th e  s tu d y  p r o c e s s .  O n c e  th e  p r a c t i c e  t r i a l s  a re  c o m p le t e d ,  th e  
p a r t i c ip a n t  w ill b e  i n f o r m e d  th a t  th e  a c tu a l  f a c e s  w i l l  b e  v ie w e d  a n d  th e  e x p e r im e n te r  w i l l  a n s w e r  
a n y  r e m a in in g  q u e s t i o n s  a b o u t  th e  p r o c e d u r e .  S t im u l i  in  t h e  s tu d y  p h a s e  w il l  b e  r a n d o m iz e d  s o  th a t  j 
e a c h  p a r t i c ip a n t  v ie w s  th e  s t im u l i  in  a  d i f f e r e n t  o rd e r .  T h e  s tu d y  p h a s e  w il l  c o n ta in  a p p r o x im a te ly  
5 0  n e u t r a l  f a c e s .
A f f e c t / I d e n t i t y  P r i m e s  S t u d y -  A ll  p r o c e d u r e s  a s  w e ll  a s  in s t r u c t io n s  f o r  th is  e x p e r im e n t  w il l  b e  
i d e n t ic a l  to  th e  A f f e c t  P r im e s  S tu d y  s e e n  a b o v e .  T h e  n u m b e r  o f  s t im u l i  in  th e  s tu d y  p h a s e  o f  t h is  
e x p e r im e n t  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  to  a b o u t  1 0 0  f a c e s  d u e  to  th e  f a c t  th a t  a  2  x  2  d e s ig n  in c o r p o r a t in g  b o th  
a f f e c t iv e  a n d  id e n t i t y  p r im e s  w i l l  b e  t e s t e d .
Affect Primes Test- P a r t i c ip a n ts  w ill  b e  in f o r m e d  th a t  a  m e m o ry  te s t  w il l  ta k e  p la c e .  P a r t i c ip a n ts  
w ill  th e n  b e  p r e s e n te d  w i th  th e  fa c e s  th a t  w e re  o r ig in a l ly  p r e s e n te d  d u r in g  th e  s tu d y  s e s s io n ,  a s  w e ll 
a s  w ith  5 0  n e w  f a c e s  th a t  w e re  n e v e r  p r e s e n te d  d u r in g  th e  s tu d y  s e s s io n .  D u r in g  p r e s e n ta t io n  o f  
e a c h  fa c e ,  p a r t i c ip a n ts  w ill  b e  a s k e d  to  in d ic a te  w h e th e r  th e  fa c e  is  " o ld ”  (w a s  p r e s e n te d  d u r in g  th e  
s tu d y  s e s s io n )  o r  " n e w ” (n e w  to  th e  t e s t  s e s s io n ) .  I f  th e  p a r t i c ip a n t  m a k e s  a n  " o ld ”  r e c o g n i t io n  
d e c i s io n ,  a  f o l lo w - u p  q u e s t io n  w il l  a p p e a r  o n  th e  c o m p u te r  s c r e e n  a s k in g  p a r t ic ip a n ts  w h e th e r  th e y  
“ r e m e m b e r e d ”  th e  fa c e  th e y  s a id  w a s  “ o ld ,”  o r  m e re ly  “ k n e w ”  th a t  th e  f a c e  th e y  id e n t i f ie d  a s  “ o ld ” 
h a d  b e e n  p r e v io u s ly  p r e s e n te d  to  th e m . A ls o  a t  th e  t im e  o f  t e s t ,  th e  s a m e  l ik e a b i l i tv  r a t in g  w ill  take- 
p la c e  fo r  i te m s  id e n t i f ie d  a s  b o th  “ o ld ”  a n d  " n e w .”
Affect/Identity Primes Test- T h e  te s t  p r o c e d u r e  lo r  th is  e x p e r im e n t  is id e n t ic a l  to  th e  A f fe c t  
P r im e s  T e s t  s e s s io n .  T h e  o n ly  d i f f e r e n c e  is  th a t  th e r e  w il l  b e  a n  in c r e a s e d  n u m b e r  o f  te s t  i te m s  a s  
c o m p a r e d  to  th e  A f f e c t  P r im e s  T e s t  d u e  to  a n  in c lu s io n  o f  id e n t i ty  p r im e s  in  c o m b in a t io n  w ith  
a f f e c t iv e  f a c e  p r im e s .
i
F o l lo w in g  th e  m e m o ry  le s t ,  p a r t i c ip a n ts  w il l  b e  d e b r ie f e d  a b o u t  th e  n a tu r e  o f  t h e  s tu d y  a n d  
th a n k e d  fo r  th e i r  p a r t ic ip a t io n .
Include one copy of all measures, e.g., questionnaires, scales. Indicate if sensitive questions are 
being asked, e.g., sexual behavior, religious beliefs, suicide ideation, and the like.
A copy of the number grid task is included
Does your research involve deception? If so, please describe the deception and the reasons for it, 
and indicate how the participants will be debriefed.
Participants are not informed they will he required to make judgments regarding the position of the 
object, or it's its original color. If participants were aware of the memory task, they would attempt to 
actively memorize the stimuli, disrupting our measures of episodic memory.
Describe any risks and/or discomforts to the participants and how you would deal with them.
There are no known risks to this experiment
Describe the procedures to be used to ensure confidentiality of participants and for preserving the 
confidentiality of data during the research, storage, disposition and in the release of the findings.
Data files will be coded so that there is no personally identifiable information associated with the 
computer files. Data will be stored on a secure drive.
Memory for Faces Letter of Information
Investigators: Devin Duke (Master’s Student) & Dr. Stefan Kohler
This study is entitled “Memory for Faces” and is being conducted by Devin Duke.
The procedure will involve viewing a series of faces on a computer screen and making 
judgments about these faces, as well as a subsequent memory test for the same faces. All 
ratings will be made using a computer key pad.
All data collected will be kept confidential and be used for research purposes only. The 
experiment will take less than one hour to complete, and participants will receive 
compensation of one research credit for their participation. Participants are free to refuse 
response to any questions and are free to withdraw from the experiment at any time without 
loss of promised credit. There are no known risks associated with this study.
Upon completion of the study, the participant will receive written feedback and will have a 
chance to have any questions regarding the study answered.
Memory for Faces Sign-Up poster
This study will involve making judgments about different faces that are presented on 
a computer screen. Also, participants will take part in a memory test for these faces as well. 
This study will take less than 1 hour to complete and each participant will receive 1 
experimental credit for his or her participation. The study will be conducted in room 7250 of 
the Social Science Centre. If you are interested in participating in this study please sign up 
using the Psychology research participation pool.
If you have any questions please contact: Devin Duke dduke@ uw o.ca 661-2111 
ext. 86299
97
Memory for Faces Informed Consent form
I h a v e  r e a d  t h e  L e t t e r  o f  I n f o r m a t i o n ,  h a v e  h a d  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h i s  s t u d y  e x p l a i n e d  t o  m e .  a n d  I a g r e e  t o  
p a r t i c i p a t e .  A l l  q u e s t i o n s  h a v e  b e e n  a n s w e r e d  t o  m y  s a t i s f a c t i o n .
N a m e :
S i g n a t u r e :  _  
D a t e :  __________




Project Title: M e m o ry  fo r  F a c es
Investigators D e v in  D u k e  (M a sc . c a n d id a te ) :  D r. S te fa n  K o h le r
T h e  p u rp o s e  o f  th is  s tu d y  is to  e x a m in e  th e  c o n tr ib u t io n  o f  s u b lim in a l a f fe c tiv e  fa c e  p rim in g  
a s  w e ll a s  id e n tity  p r im in g  o n  fa m ilia r ity  a s s e s s m e n t in  a  re c o g n it io n  m e m o ry  te s t . T h e  in te rp la y  o f  
im p lic it  e m o tio n a l in f lu e n c e s  o n  e x p lic it  fa c e  re c o g n itio n  h a s  b e e n  la rg e ly  u n d e re x p lo re d . W e a re  
in te re s te d  p a r tic u la r ly  in  th e  in te ra c tio n  o f  a f fe c tiv e  p r im e s  w ith  id e n tity  p r im e s  d u e  to  an  e x te n s iv e  
p a s t l i te ra tu re  d is p la y in g  a c lo s e  r e la tio n s h ip  o f  p ro c e s s in g  f lu e n c y  m a n ip u la tio n s  d u r in g  a  m em o ry  
te s t a n d  an  in c re a se  s u b je c tiv e  sen se  o f  fa m ilia r i ty  fo r  n o v e l, n e v e r  e x p e r ie n c e d  s tim u li. B y  te s tin g  
b o th  a ffe c tiv e  p r im e s  a n d  id e n tity  p r im e s  (p ro c e s s in g  f lu e n c y  m a n ip u la tio n ) , w e  w ill b e  a b le  to  
d e te rm in e  w h e th e r  an  a lte rn a tiv e  s u b lim in a l a f fe c tiv e  a ro u s a l s ig n a l g iv e n  a t th e  tim e  o f  te s t w ill 
re su lt in  an  a d d itiv e  lev e l o f  fa lse  fa m ilia r i ty  fo r  fa c e s , o r  in te ra c tiv e  re la tio n s h ip .
P re v io u s  re s e a rc h  in re c o g n itio n  m e m o ry  s u g g e s ts  th a t c o v e r t  a ro u s a l,  n o t re la te d  o r  in d u c e d  
by  th e  s tu d y  s tim u li i ts e lf , re su lts  in  a fa lse  s e n s e  o f  fa m ilia r i ty  fo r  n o v e l  a n d  o ld  s tim u li a t th e  tim e  o f  
m e m o ry  te s tin g  (G o M in g e r  a n d  H a n se n . 2 0 0 5  ). T h e s e  F ind ings in d ic a te  th a t a s e n s e  o f  “ free  
s ta n d in g "  a ro u s a l c a n  b e  in te rp re te d  by an  in d iv id u a l a s  fa m il ia r  p a s t e x p e r ie n c e ,  e v e n  w h e n  
p ro c e ss in g  flu e n c y  h a s n 't  b e en  m a n ip u la te d . L e ft u n a n s w e re d  b y  th is  p a s t li te ra tu re  is  h o w  
s u b lim in a l a f fe c tiv e  p r im e s  m ay  c o n tr ib u te  to  fa m ilia r i ty  a s s e s s m e n t d u r in g  a  re c o g n itio n  m e m o ry  
test.
W h a le n  (1 9 9 8 )  s h o w e d  tha t su b lim in a l p r im in g  o f  fe a rfu l fa c e s  led  to  an  in c re a se d  re sp o n se  
o f  th e  a m y g d a la  w h e n  p a r tic ip a n ts  w e re  c o n s c io u s ly  s h o w n  n e u tra l  fa c e s  a s  c o m p a re d  to  n eu tra l faces  
th a t w e re  p r im e d  w ith  n o n -e m o tio n a l fa c es . T h is  a f fe c tiv e  r e s p o n se  m a d e  b y  th e  a m y g d a la  m ay  
re p re sen t o r  m ir ro r  th e  ‘T ree  s ta n d in g "  a ro u s a l s ig n a l th a t h a s  b e en  sh o w n  in  o th e r  s tu d ie s , to  b e  
p e rc e iv e d  a s  fa m ilia r  e x p e r ie n c e . If  a  c le a r  b e h a v io u ra l e f fe c t o f  s u b lim in a l a f fe c tiv e  p rim in g  tak es  
p la c e , th is  p a s t  p e rc e p tu a l l i te ra tu re  w ill p ro v id e  c le a r  im a g in g  h y p o th e s is  if  th e  s tu d y  is  a d a p te d  fo r
B y p a r tic ip a tin g  in  th is  s tu d y , y o u  h a v e  p ro v id e d  u s  w ith  d a ta  to  e x p lo re  th e  in te ra c tio n  
b e tw e e n  a f fe c t  a n d  fa m ilia r i ty  a sse ssm e n t. Y o u r re s p o n se s  w ill b e  c o m b in e d  w ith  th e  re s p o n se s  o f  
o th e r s  to  d e te rm in e  w h e th e r  s u b lim in a l e m o tio n a l a ro u s a l w ill re s u lt  in  fe e lin g s  o f  fa lse  
fa m ilia r ity . T h e s e  F ind ings w ill c o n tr ib u te  to  o u r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  th e  u n d e r ly in g  m e c h a n is m s  o f  
m e m o ry  sy s te m s .
F o r  fu r th e r  in fo rm a tio n  o n  th is  to p ic , y o u  m a y  w ish  to  re a d  th e  fo llo w in g  a rtic le s :
W h a le n , P. J . (1 9 9 8 ) . F ea r, v ig ila n c e , a n d  a m b ig u ity : in it ia l  n e u ro im a g in g  s tu d ie s  o f  th e  h u m an  
a m y g d a la . C u rre n t D ire c tio n s  in  P s y c h o lo g ic a l S c ie n c e . 7 ,1 7 7 -1 8 8 .
fMRl.
G o ld in g e r  S D . H a n se n  W A . R e m e m b e rin g  b y  th e  s e a t o f  y o u r  p a n ts . P sv e h o l S e i. 2 0 0 5  
J u l : l6 (7 ) :5 2 5 -9 .
If you have questions about your rights as a research subject, you should contact 
The Director of the Office of Research Ethics at ethics©uwo.ca or 
661- 3036.
